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INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL ASPECT 
I 
I 
I 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In June, 1948, Chinese students in Peiping and Shanghai 
held big demonstrations against American policy toward Japan. 
It is significant, in addition, that the Chinese professors 
of several important universities and high government offic-
ials, not small in number, advocated such a moll'e and protested 
1 
to both President Truman and General MacArthur. 
Against these moves, American Ambassador Leighton Stuart, Dr. 
Wang Shi-chieh, Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Dr. 
Chu Chia-hwa, Chinese Minister of Education, issued statements 
emphasizing that although the Chinese and American Governments 
differed in some other policies toward post-war Japan, they 
did accord in one policy at least, i.e., not to rebuild a 
2 
strong and militaristic Japan. 
It is easy to understand that the Chinese are particu-
I larly sensitive in everything about Japan, just as the French 
I are about Germany. Sixty years of aggression, plundering, 
1. Ta Kung Pao, The leading independent newspaper in Shanghai, 
China, June 2, 1948. 
2. Ambassador Stuart's statement- on June 4, 1948, see u.s. 
State Department !h!ldetin, Vol. XVIII, No. 468, June 20, 
1948. Dr.-wing's and-nr7 Chu 1 s statements appeared partly 
in citation in The New York Time~ editorial on June 22, 
1948. 
-1-
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1 
I ravaging are too fresh to be forgotten. The Chinese seek no 
II 
I
; revenge, however, they do expect some guarantee that these 
bloody stories will not repeat themselves in the future. Cer-
1 tainly they should have an absolute and sacred right in such a 
hope. Since V-J day the Chinese have lacked accurate inform-
ation from Japan. They do not know what General MacArthur is 
doing there. From newspapers they read, rather incompletely, 
the stories of busy visits of George F. Kennan, chief Russian 
policy planner of the State Department, and William H. Draper, 
Up!;ler-Secretary of the Army, 3 together with the big headlines 
of the $13,000,000 Misawa Air Base built in north Honshu by 
the US Army, 4 and the increase of the Japanese patrol fleet to 
5 125 ships. All these, added to Communist's propaganda, led 
them easily to arrive at the conclusion that the post-war 
American policy toward Japan is to rebuild a strong power as a 
watch dog in the Far East against Russia. And they feared, not 
unreasonably, that once Japan becomes strong again, the first 
victim would again be China, not Russia. 
Such uneasiness of the Chinese people is, perhaps, due 
to misinformation or lack of information. It seems to be 
3. Both Mr. Kennan and Mr. Draper visited Japan to study the 
recovery program in the Spring of 1948. 
4. The New York Times, May 3, 1948. 
5. Ibid, May 23, 1948. 
important, therefore, to examine General MacArthur's policy 
and measures in Japan during the last three years of occupa-
tion. Our attention should be directed chiefly upon his dem-
ocra tic reform:~, assuming that a democratic Japan would be less 
' 
I 
of a threat, if not a guarantee, to world peace. Japan should ,i 
" not be allowed to return to her totalitarian past and to repeat 1 
the errors she has committed, for her own good as well as for 
the world' a. • 
It is for this reason that we study post-war democratic 
reform in Japan. We are going to examine every major directive . 
I 
issued by the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers in connection I 
therewith. Laws and decrees concerning the democratic reform 
are to be classified, their practice and actual progress 
checked, and their significance marked by comparing with the 
pre-surrender conditions. We hope not only to have a panorama 
of what General MacArthur has done there, but to judge whether !i 
his work is adequate or inadequate, and if inadequate, for what j 
reasons, and to suggest what should be done about it. I 
I 
I 
I 
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REMOVAL OF OBSTACLES 
li 
I 
I 
I 
I 
. ,i 
I 
II 
CHAPTER II 
GENERAL ASPECT OF DEMOCRATIC REFORM 
1. ~ Nature. The basic decision among the Allies for 
democratic reform in Japan was found in the Potsdam Proclama-
tion which stated: 
The Japanese government shall remove all obstacles 
to the revival and strengthening of democratic tenden-
cies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of 
religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the 
fundamental human rights shall be established. 
The occupying forces of the Allies shall be with-
drawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been 
accomplished and there has been established in accord-
ance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese 
people a peacefully inclined and responsible govern-
ment. 
The proclamation indicates: (1) Post-war democratic re-
form in Japan is to follow the Western pattern, not the 
"people's democracy" as visioned by Soviet Russia. This ques-
tion has to be raised because, although Russia was not the orig-
inal signator of this proclamation on July 26, 1945, she has 
apparently approved this Proclamation by her later participa-
tion in the war against Japan on August 9, 1945. Perhaps the 
Russian interpretation of this document would not necessarily 
be the same as that of the Western powers. (2) The reforms 
would be compulsory, if the Japanese government could not 
initiate those reforms themselves, although "in accordance with 
-4-
the freely expressed will of the Japanese peopleu. The accom-
plishment of those "objectives 11 quoted above is certainly the 
prescribed condition for the Allied powers to withdraw their 
occupying troops. 
It is to be noted that despite democratic reform being 
the general Allied policy for post-war Japan, exactly what 
would be the form of the future Japanese government was not 
decided before the surrender. For instance, the Allies held 
different views concerning the Japanese Emperor system. The 
Chinese favored a Japanese democracy without the Emperor. The 
British liked a Japanese democracy of their type, maintaining 
the Emperor as the British king. In the United States, the 
opinions were divided into both the British and Chinese ideas, 
although generally believing their own way of life, and hoping 
Japan would wish to copy it. In Russia the picture was rather 
different on the future Japanese democracy, although in con-
currence with the Chinese conception of abolishing the Emperor. 
The exact form of the post-war Japanese government, however, 
was later decided solely by the United States. The 1947 
constitution, as shall be discussed later, was drafted by 
General MacArthur's staff with the approval of the Washington 
War, Navy, and State Departments, together with other democrat-
ization measures. Two Allied organs, the Far Eastern Commis-
IJ sion in Washington and the Allied Control Council in Tokyo, 
I 
-5-
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have exercised only limited authority; very largely advisory.l 
The Far Eastern Commission had strong doubts on the advisabil-
ity of the 1947 constitution, for in March, 1947, it sent a 
directive to the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, asking 
whether the document reflected the desires of the Japanese 
people, and requesting that it should be reconsidered by the 
Diet for its possible revision not earlier than May 194e and 
2 
not later than May 1949. But any difference of opinion among 
other Allies had no effect on the democratic reform in Japan, 
since from the very beginning the United States had decided 
that "if disagreement of the Allies arises, the policy of the 
3 
United States will govern". Therefore, it can be concluded 
that besides following the Western pattern an~ compulsory in 
nature, post-war democratic reform in Japan was chiefly die-
tated by the United States, or sponsored by her representative, 
General Mac Arthur. 
2. The Aim. The aim of democratic reform in Japan, as 
expressed in the Potsdam Declaration and the United States 
Initial Post-War Polley Statement for Japan of August 29, 1945, I 
I 1. John \'I. Masland, "Post-\'iar Government and Poll tics in Japa In in Post-War Government in the Far East, edited by Taylor I 
Cole and John H. Hallowell-;--K'allman Publishing Co., (1947), 
p. 566. 
2. 
3· 
"FEC and Japanese Constitution", U.S. State Department 
Bulletin, Vol. XVI, No. 409, May ~947. Also see New 
York Times, May 23, 1943. ---
~ Initial Post-lvar Policy Statement of August 29, 1945, 
cited by Harold Wakefield in his New Paths for Japan, 
Oxford University Press, (1943), ~12g, ---
is to enS:.ure that Japan wi 11 not again become a menace to the 
United States or to the peace and security of the world; that 
Japan will have a government which will carry out its inter-
national responsibilities, respect the rights of other states, 
and support the objectives of the United Nations • 114 
3. The Method. The method of carrying out the policy of 
I democratic reform in Japan, like other occupying policies, is 
to use the existing political machine and the personnel (except 
the war criminals or those subject to the Removal and Exclusion 
5 Directive of the SCAP) to execute all democratic measures 
ordered by SCAP, including the reform of government structure, 
not to upset the existing government and establish a new one. 
The manner as well as the reason to adopt this method were 
given in detail also in the Initial Policy Statement mentioned 
above which reads: 
In view of the present character of Japanese 
society and the desire of the United States to 
attain its objectives with a minimum commitment 
of its forces and resources, the Supreme Commander 
will exercise his authority through Japane~~ machin-
ery and agencies, including the Emperor, to the ex-
tent t.bat this satisfactorily furthers United States' 
objectives. The Japanese government will. be per-
mitted, under his instructions, to exercise the nor-
mal pONers of government in natters of domestic ad-
ministration. This policy, however, will be subject 
to the right and duty of the Supreme Commander to 
require changes in governmental machinery or per-
sonnel or to act directly if the Emperor or 
Ibid. The full text of that statement is in the appendix 13, 
OCCU~tion of Japan, State Department publication 267, 
(1946~pp.-73-81. The full text of the Potsdam Proclama-
tion concerning Japan is also in the appendix. 3, pp. 53-55. 
5. See Chapter IV: THE PURGES, pp. 16-17. 
-7-
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other Japanese authority does not satisfactorily 
meet the requirements of the Supreme Commander in 
effectuating the surrender terms. This policy, 
moreover, does not commit the Supreme Commander to 
support the Emperor or any other Japanese authority 
in opposition to evolutionary changes looking toward 
the attainment of the US' objectives. The policy is 
to use the existing form of government in Japan, not 
to support it. Changes in the form of government 
initiated by the Japanese people in the direction of 
modifying ita feudal and authoritarian tendencies are 
to be permitted and favored. In the event that the 
effectuating of such changes involves the use of 
foi'ce by the Japanese people or government against 
persons opposed thereto, the Supreme Commander 
should intervene only when necessary to ensure the 
security of his forces and the attainment of all 
other objectives of the occupation. 
4. The Measures. The Statement quoted above further 
prescribed that certain measures should be taken concerning 
democratic reforms. It said that persons closely associated 
T 
II 
I 
i 
I, 
I 
I 
I 
with .Japan's aggressive past or suspected of atrocities were to j 
be tried, nationalist societies were to be abolished and 
,I 
political prisoners set free. Laws were to be passed ensuring I 
civil rights. The Japanese were to be encouraged to study 
democratic institutions, and, subject to the security of the 
occupying forces, to develop political parties. Trade union 
activity was to be favored, and the large banking and indus-
trial combinations were to be dissolved. 
All these measures, to be sure, were put into practice 
by General MacArthur during the last. three years of occupation. 
These are the main topics to be discussed in this thesis. They 
are to be classified into two large categories. The first is 
I 
II I l ___ li 
---
I! 
to remove all obstacl~ to the revival and strengthening of 
democratic tendencies among the Japanese people; the second is 
1 to reform the government structure along the line of Western 
I democracy and :pirty politics. Those belonging to the first 
/ group are the e llmina tion of State Shintoism~ the purges on war I 
I 
criminals and "undesirable persons", the abrogation of 
Kempeitai (secret police)~ the outlaw of certain ultranational- I 
istic parties and societies, and the decentralization of big 
1
1 
business (dissolution of the Zaibatsu). Those attaching to the /! 
I 
second group are the new constitution, the "Bill of rights", 1 
tbe encouragement of political parties, the development of 
labor unions, the ema.ncipa tion of women, and the land reform. 
And the measures of reeducation are generally regarded as the 
basic reform whose success or failure will determine the 
validity and the durability of all democratic reforms listed 
above. They are to be discussed one by one beginning with 
Chapter III. 
I 
I 
i 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
i 
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PARr TWO 
-----
REMOVAL OF OBSTACLES 
I 
!i 
li 
I 
I 
_1 
CHAPTER III 
THE ELIMINATION OF STATE SHINTOISM 
1. The Bulwark£! Dictatorship. The mysterious and 
/r superstitious nature of the Japanese people could be repre-
sented by their state Shintoism which served as a driving force 
for their expansion and imperialism. It is characterized by 
its Emperor worship and ancestor worship. Its basic assumption 
is that the Emperor is god, deriving his power from being a 
direct descendant of the first Emperor Jimmu, who ruled Japan 
two thousand six hundred years ago and who, the Japanese child 
was taught, had the Sun Goddess as his great-great grandmother. 
1 Another fanta.s tic teaching of State Shintoism is that the 
I Japanese people and their is lands were also descended from that 
I sun Goddess. Since the Japanese people have so shared the I 
l
i 
I 
divine origin, they are, of course, superior to any people of 
the world. This theory naturally resulted in the Emperor's 
omnipotence in the Japanese mind, and made the people to in-
cline to jingoism and chauvinism. It built, after all, a 
solid base for Japan's political dictatorship. 
2. The Development of State Shintoism. Although 
Shintoism was Japan's native religion, existing before 
Confucianism and Buddhism, it bad not developed into a 
-10-
r 
I 
l 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
,, 
I 
I 
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I national belief and achieved so much political importance 
until the Restoration of Meiji of 1868. For a time during I the I 
Shogunates Buddhism was more powerful than Shintoism. The 
reaffirmation of the divinity of the Emperors and the divine 
miss ion of' the Japanese race were chiefly the efforts of 
Norinaga Motoori and Yoshida Shoin, two g~eat architects of the 
Meiji Restoration. The Confucius' doctrine of Wangtao, the 
continued existence through the centuries of thousands of way-
side Shinto shrines, as well as the daily worship before the 
"kamidana" in countless peasant homes, also contributed to such 
1 
e. revival and development. 
3. Tll'..acArthur's "Bombs". For purpose of shelling this 
psychological bulwark of dictatorship General MacArthur has 
thrown two "bombs". One was the Imperial Rescript of June 1, 
1946, in accordance with SCAP's directive, which declares that 
hereafter "the ties between the Emperor and the people do not 
depend upon mere legends and myths, not on the false conception 
that the Emperor is divine and that the Japanese people are 
superior to other races and fated to rule the world. 112 The 
other was the 1947 constitution which forbids the use of 
. 3 public money or property to support any religion and which, 
besides abrogation of the Emperor's traditional prerogatives, 
1. Wakefield, .2.£• cit., p. 3. 
2. Occupatiog of Japan, £2• cit., Appendix 25, pp. 133-135. 
3. The Constitution of Japan, 1947, Chapter VII, Art. 85. 
I 
I 
I 
II 
I 
i 
provides that the Emperor is deriving his position from the 
sovereign will of the people, not from the ancient Sun Goddess~ 
5 
To show that the Emperor is not "sacred and inviolable" 
or divine, Hirohito made many public appearances in cities and 
countrysides during the first two years of Allied occupation, 
bowed low to his people, with few guards. Very few Japanese 
had ever seen an Emperor until Hirohito's visits. The ruler 
formerly always dwelt behind the veils of a ecrecy and myth in 
forbidden palaces. Whenever he emerged, hundreds of police 
were on guard, and no a ubjeet was permitted to look directly 
at him. None spoke his name, none dared criticize him, or 
I 
I 
I 
He II 
But 11 
doubted openly that he w.as descended from the Sun Goddess, 
had no distinct personality as an individual human being. 
now the Emperor appears; the people look at close range with I' 
tl 
II 
their own eyes, and discovered that he is as amicable and 1! 
These visits are even more I' common as their immediate neighbor. 
I 
meaningful and effective than the new constitution or the Im-
I ,I 
perial Rescript mentioned above, in terms of eltminating State jl 
Shintoism and teaching democracy to the Japanese people. 
General P~cArthur has put pressure on the Emperor to 
abandon his deity. He did, however, nothing to the wayside 
Shinto shrines. It is es.:timated that more than 100,000 Shinto 
4. Ibid, Chapter I, Art. 1. 
5. Article I of the Meiji Constitution says that the Emperor 
is "sacred and inviolable", and descended from a 11 line of 
E1nperors unbroken for ages eternaltt. 
-12-
shrines remain intact. Although they lost some of 
· I 
their appeal 1
1 
immediately after the surrender, they are now regaining faith 
in millions of Japanese visitors. The visitors to the Grand 
Shrine of Ise and to the Meiji Shrine in Tokyo increased tre-
mendously since 1947. The former is dedicated to the Sun God-
.dess while the latter is for the worship of Emperor Meiji. 
According to s ta tis tics being published the Ise Grand Shrine 
had 100,000 visitors during the New Year's holiday of 1949--an 
6 increase of about one-third over last year. , Of these, 60,000 
appeared in a single day according to Japanese press reports. 
I About 1,500,000 yen was received during the holiday period; of 
1 this sum half came from voluntary contributions and the re-
mainder from the sale of talismans and entrance fees for 
ceremonial dances. 7 This is particularly dangerous in view of 
the fact that the existence of those shrines was one of the 
factors which contributed to the Meiji Restoration. There is 
a strong possibility for a rejuvenation of the Emperor's 
divinity once the occupation ends. 
6. The New York Times, Jan. 8, 1949. 
7. Ibid:----
I 
I 
I 
I 
,, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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CHAPTER IV. 
THE PURGES 
1. The Meaning of Pur~. The Potsdam Proclamation 
stated that "stern justice shall be meted out to all war crim-
inals". Imnediately after the occupation, SCAP began to trans-
form this policy into per,formanee. Persecution of t~e war 
criminals not only furthered justice but removed elements which 
would ha.v e been naturally antagonistic to the establishment 
of democracy in Japan. 
2. !!:£ Trials • The Japanese government was ordered to 
! 
deliver accused war criminals to SCAP for imprisonment, and, if 
1 
they could not be delivered, to reply why. I By the end of 1945, 
1 
I some 600 Japanese had been accused of war crimes, and the major J 
culprits included the highest ranking militarists, politicians, 
and industrialists. The notorious criminals arrested were 
Field Marshal Prince Nashimoto, a relative of the Emperor 
Hirihito; Marquis Koichi Kido, Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal 
and war-time advisor to Hirohito; Prince Konoye, three times 
Prime Minister between June, 1937 and October 1941 (Konoye 
committed suicide before he could be arrested); General Hideki 
Tojo, Prime Minister at the time of Pearl Harbor (Tojo 
1. Occupation of Japan, .22· cit., p. 27. I 
L 
--, 
I -14-
, 
r 
I 
--~ 
attempted suicide by shooting but subsequently recovered from 
his wound); Yosuke Matsuoka, who sponsored Japan's entry into 
the Axis; Kiichiro Hiranuma, Ex-president of the Emperor's 
Privy Council; Kuniaki Koiso, a wartime Prime Minister; and 
General Araki, one of the men who engineered the invasion of 
Manchuria and China. By mid-1948, those kept in prison were 
numbered at 1,128, including the minor criminals who were 
chiefly responsible for atrocitiea.2 Those leading criminals 
were waiting for trial in the International Military Tribunal, 
set up by SCA.P on January 19, 1946, in accordance with the 
II 
/I 
'I 
,, 
Potsdam Declaration and on the legal basis set up at Nuremberg. ! 
After two years and nine months of trial and testification, 
the Tribunal at last on November 12, 1948 sentenced seven to 
death, sixteen to life imprisonment, one twenty years' 1m-
3 pris onment. 
2. Russell Brines, MacArthur'~ Japan, J.B. Lippincott Co., 
( 1948) p. 114. 
3. The leading war criminals on trial by the Military Tribunal 
were 28 in number, two died in prison and one (Dr. Shumei 
Okawa) went mad. Thus remained 25 to be sentenced. See 
I 
UP, Nov. 12, 1948. Those sentenced for life imprisonment 
are: Gen. Sadao Araki, War Minister; Col Kingoro Hashimoto, II 
who sank the Panay; Field Marshal Shunroki Hata, Commander 
in China; Naron Kiichiro Hiranuma, former Premier; Naoki 
Hoshino, Tojo's chief planner; Okinori Kaya, Finance Min-
ister; Marquis Koohi Kido~ Emperor's advisor; Gen. Kuniaki 
Koiso, Premier after Tojo; Gen. Jiro Minami, War Minister; 
Adm. Takasumi Oka, Navy Bureau Director; Gen. Hiroshi 
Oshima, Ambassador to Germany; Lt. pen. Kenryo Shimada, 
chief of military affairs bureau; Adm. Shigetaro Shimada, 
Navy Chief of Staff; Toshio Shiratori, Ambassador to Italy; 
Lt. Gen. Kenr'yo Shimada, Chief of Military Affairs Bureau; 
and Lt. Gen. Teiichi Suzuki, Commander in _Manchuria. 20 
1 
yrs. imprisonment: Shigenori Togo, Foreign Minister in Tojos
1 
I Cab.; 7 ~ra. imprisonment: Mamoru Shigemitsu, who signed 1 
i . 
• 
I 
I 
I. 
the surrender. . , 
-15-
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I. 
I 
The seven who hanged are: 
1. Hideki Tojo, war-time Prime Minister, responsible 
for Pearl Harbor; 
2. General Kanji Doihara, Manchurian plotter; 
3. Koki Hirota, former Premier; 
4. General Seishiro Itagaki, War Minister; 
5. General Heitaro Kimura, Manchurian Army Chief; 
6. General Iwane Matsui, Commander at sacking of 
Nanking; 
?. Lt. Gen. Akira Muto, chief of staff in Phillippines. 
Tojo and six others were executed on December 22, 1948, 
48 hours after the US Supreme Court declined the jurisdiction 
over the appeal by Koki Hirota and Kenji Doihara. Their ashes 
were scatter ed in order to minimize, as far as possible , the 
4 
chance of worship of the prisoners' remains. Hirohito him-
self was exempted from war trial, although under protests from 
Australian and Chinese judges in the Tribunal. The reason for 
his exemption was not consideration of justice, but of polit-
ical convenience. 
3. Removal of Undesirable Public Officials. To purge 
the war criminals was only part of the job. Another important 
move was the removal and exclusion of undesirable personnel 
from public office.5 It included nearly all thooe ., large or 
small, who had contributed to the policy of expansion, aggres-
sion, ultranationalism; those who had been members of terror-
is tic or secret societies; secret police; and tl:Ds e who 
4. The New York T~es, Dec. 23, 1948. 
5. FOr deta~see SCAP Directive, Jan. 4, 1946, Occupation of 
Japan, 2E• cit., pp. 99-112. 
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had ruled Korea, Formosa, Manchuria and all other occupied 
areas in China, south-east Asia, Dutch East Indies, Phillip-
pines and other is lands. Registration, investigation and 
questionnaire on all civil servants were ordered. All vacan-
cies should be filled by those "who would foster the revival 
and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese 
people and who will respect fundamental human rights and free-
dom of speech, religion, and thought .. " "If existing civil 
service qualification regulations provide obstacles to the 
appointment of such officials, such regulations shall be 
amended or superseded.rr6 
As a direct result of SCAP purge directive on undesir-
able persons, nine of every ten high officials of the Japanese 
government were declared ineligible to hold office, and 120 
political organizations were put into the process of dissolu-
tion in January, 1946. As a whole, 170,000 men associated 
with the Japanese military past were affected by this direc-
tive.7 The Japanese national election was postponed from 
March 31 to April 10, 1946, to give the reorganized Home 
Minis try more time to "screen" prospective candida tea. Barely 
no more than 50 members of the old Diet could offer them-
selves as candidates for the April elections. 
6. Occupation of Japan, 2£• cit., p. 101~ 
7. ~., p. 20. 
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CHAPTER V 
REVOLUTION IN POLICE FORCE 
Every totalitarian state is typical in its police con-
trol of every activity of human life. Like Fascist Italy and 
Nazi Germany, the former Japanese police force was directly 
controlled by the Home Ministry. Local authorities could not 
have their own police force, or appoint their own police 
chiefs. The Chief Police Inspector was an official of the 
Home Ministry directly responsible to the Minister. The 
policemen bad far-reaching power in regulating and supervising 
the lives of citizens, and deference was paid to them by the 
masses as the immediate representatives of the authority of 
the state. 
1. · Tokugawa Tradition. The speciat characteristics of 
the Japanese police were largely due to the historical origins 
of the force. Under the Tokugawa, both in the territories 
directly ruled by the Shosun, and in the fiefs, there was an 
elaborate police and spy system, of which espionage into the 
private affairs of the people was a prominent feature. For 
the purpose of understanding the Japanese police force, whose 
contribution to Japanese political dictatorship is so great, 
it seems worthwhile to depict the Tokugawa police system. 
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At the top of the organization were the 11 ometsuke" 
(great censors or inspectors), who have been called "the eyes 
and ears of the Shogun. 11 Associated with the "ometsuke 11 who 
were expected to observe the activities of the 11 daimyo", were 
the "metsuke", or inspectors of second rank, to keep an eye 
1 
upon the 11ha.tamoto" ani "samurai". The inspectors reported 
I 
upon the conduct of the daimyo and lesser retainers, the dis-
cussion in public meetin~, and the action of great off icials. 
Beneath the metsuke, there were two orders of police, the 
"thief-catchers" or police proper, and the spies. The spies 
often disguised themselves as priests, innkeepers, or persons 
of other occupations thus more easily to make contact with the 
public and give them opporta~ities for observation and t h e 
gathering of informs. ti on. 
"Its systems and regulations 11 , said Baron Oura Y~netake, 
"seem to have been well adapted to the organization and con-
dition of society in feudal times, and were quite efficient 
2 for the preservation of peace and order". However, it was 
undoubtedly oppressive and arbit·rary in operation. "Indeed," 
said Dickson, "whenever two or three persons meet together in 
1. "Daimyo" and "hatamoto" were Japanese lords under the Sho-
gunate feuda 1 system. "Daimyo" means ttgrea t names", or 
~reat lords. 11Hatamoto" means "bannerrnen", or lesser lords 
1 Samura i 11 , the "two-swarded men'', was a military class 
during the period of Shogunate feudalism. They were non-
product! ve, and the farmers were under obligation to m&.iil-
tain them. Although this class was in the.ory the national 
militia, in fact it also was organized by ci.a ns. 
2. CountS. Okuma, Fifty Years of~ Japa~, (London, 1909), 
p. 281. 
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Japan, there seems to be some member of this silently obser-
vant office present. Reports of everything that goes on 
throughout the empire are sent into this office for the in-
formation of the government, and these reports are recorded 
for reference."3 
In the Meiji period, the system inherited from Tokugawa 
was used to establish central control against local feudal 
recalcit.rance; thus it was regarded for a long time as a semi-
military organization auxiliary to the newly formed national 
army, and its military character was accentuated by the fact 
that after the "samurai" was disbanded as a privileged mili-
tary caste, many of them took service either with the police 
or in the army and brought into both forces their traditions 
and habits of mind. The Japanese police retained this stamp 
until 1945, and the centralized control to which they were 
subjected--similar to a system of military control--intensi-
fied their military outlook. 
2. Kempeitai. Besides the civil police which were 
centralized and possessed extensive power, there were secret 
police or "kempeitai" which belonged to the War Ministry and 
were empowered 'to deal with cases of espionage. They were 
less active during peace time within Japan itself, but were 
the most terroristic organization in war time both in Japan 
3. Walter Dickson, Japan (Edinburgh, 1849), p. 316. 
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and in territories under Japanese colonial rule or military 
occupation. In fact, they rivalled the Gestapo in infamy. 
They used torture freely and did not appear to be bound by any 
rules of procedure or aruninistrative regulations, relying on 
the protection of the Army against all civil claims for re-
dress. 
3. MacArthur's Steps. It was apparent that with all 
these police systems, fundamental human rights and freedom, 
the basis of democracy, could hardly be expected. General 
MacArthur took two steps to revolutionize the police system. 
First, on January 16, 1946, he ordered the Japanese government 
to disband and abolish the 11kempeitai" (secret police) and all 
other organiza tiona or mobile forces organized to augme_nt : the 
Japanese civil police force. All their weapons and ammunitio 
were to be delivered to the United States Army Occupation 
Forces on or before March 1, 1946, in ace orda.nce with the 
established disarmament procedures. Their members were either 
put into prison (if accused of committing atrocities on ,for-
eigners or war prisoners) or barred from public service in 
accordance with the SOAP purge directives. The second step 
was to reform the civil police. By a directive of October 4, 
1945, which was a virtual "Bill of Rights", the Japanese 
police and the Home Ministry were immediately stripped of the 
authority over censorship and control of thought, speech, 
religion, and assembly. All agencies in charge of these 
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functions were abolished. As a result, almost 5,000 members 
of the Japanese police system, including 100 top-ranking of-
ficials, were removed from office. 4 Because of the newly 
organized and partially decentralized police system, together 
with the popular election of prefectural governors, the Home 
Minis try became an anpty agency and was abolished on January 
1, 1948. 
All these steps taken by SCAP were on the negative side. 
On the positive side, however, no achievement could be seen. 
The Japanese policemen were fixed by General MacArthur at a 
total of 93,935 on October 11, 1945. 5 This number was even 
6 larger than that of 1938 which was 67,000. Now this number 
has been raised to 120,000, whose task, according to General 
MacArthur, is simply to preserve internal order; and among 
. 7 them, it is reported, no more than twenty percent have pistols. 
However, it must be remembered that a large part of the present 
police force are former members, they can hardly change their 
habit and thought in a short time of three years. Nor can the 
people change their traditional fear toward the police; they 
know fairly that the policemen are now not only backed by 
their government, but also by a more powerful authority, the 
SCAP. 
4. Occupatioq of Japan, £2• cit., p. 19. 
5. Summation of Non-Milita~ Activities in Japan, Nov., 1945. 
6. The Far ~ast Year Book, 941, p. 140.-
7. The New Yorir TI'iii9s-;rlarch 2, 1949. 
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For the sake of improving the Japanese police, General 
MacArthur sent for Mr. Lewis Valentine, former Police Commis-
sioner of New York Cityl to serve as consultant on police 
affairs. But Vale'ntine 's advice was chiefly concerned with 
improving the efficiency--cars, radios, roving patrolmen and 
so on. However, what Japanese police really lack is not 
efficiency (although they use old techniques rather than the 
mechanized equipments), but the understanding and appreciation 
of the meaning of democracy and civil liberties. 
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CHAPTER VI 
DISSOLUTION OF CERTAIN PARTIES AND SOCIETIES 
1. A Block to Democracy. Few people note that certain 
Japanese parties and societies have contributed to Japan's 
expansion .abroad and obstruction to democratic tendencies at 
home. Some of these societies openly supported the government 
policy of aggression and imperial ism, others secretly adopted 
the tactics of assassination and terrorism to put down the 
democratic, pacifistic and liberal movements. For example, 
the Black Dragon Society, under the aegis of Ryohei Uchida, 
had played an important part in the Japanese foreign policy 
toward China in the last twenty years. It was this society 
which carefully wrought the Mukden Incident of September 18, 
1931, leading to Japan's occupation of Manchuria and formation 
of a puppet goverlli~ent under Henry Pu Yi of Manchukuo. Mem-
bers of this society have habitually employed . the drug traffic 
prostitution, sm:~ggling, and blackmail in Japanese imperial 
interests, adroitly combined with illicit private profit. At 
home, these societies have repeatedly intimidated the prudent, 
moderate, liberal and democratic tendencies of the population 
by adopting terroristic methods such as murder and assassina-
tion, for fear that they might hinder the national policy of 
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militaristic expansion. These we can see in the murder of 
Osa.chi Ha.maguohi, Mineeito statesman and Prime Minister, one 
of the strongest advocates of a prudent foreign policy, in 
November, 1930; of Tsuyoshi Inukai, Seiyukai leader and Premier. 
in May, 1932; of two ex-Premiers, Korekiyo Takahashi, Finance 
Minister, and Admiral Makoto Saito, Lord Keeper of the Privy 
Seal, in Februa~y, 1936. Capitalist Baron Takuma Dan, one of 
Mitsui chiefs, was murdered in March, 1932; and socialist 
Sakae Osugi was assassinated in prison after the earthquake of 
1923. Whatever the motives of those murderers and intriguers, 
they favored a. severely militarized state controlling the bus-
iness monopolies as well as labor in order to achieve the 
strongest power for the purpose of expansion and imperialism 
and thus improving their own fortunes and careers. In other 
words, they were strong advocates and supporters of a Fascist 
type of government; and their abolishment, in the writer's 
opinion, was helpful to democracy. 
2. Action of SCAP. On January 4, 1946, SCAP gave orders 
to the Japanese government "to prohibit the formation of any 
political pa.rty, association, society or other organization 
and any activity on the part of any of them or of any individ-
ual or group whose purpose, or the effect of whose activity, 
1 is the following: 
1. Resistance or opposition to the occupation forces 
or to orders issued by the Japanese government in 
1. Occu ation of Ja an, pp. 112-113. 
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response to directives of the SCAP; 
2. Support or justification of aggressive Japanese 
military action abroad; 
3. Exclusion of foreign persons in Japan from trade, 
commerce, or the exercise of their professions; 
4. Arrogation by Japan of leadership of other Asiatic, 
Indonesian, or Malayan peoples; 
5. Opposition to a free cultural or intellectual ex-
change between Japan and for~ign countries; 
6. Affording military or quasi-military training, 
or affording benefits, g;r-ea ter than similar 
civilian benefits, or special rep~esentation 
for persons formerly members of the Army or Navy, 
or perpetuation of militarism or a martial spirit 
in Japan; 
7. Alteration of policy by assassination or other 
terroristic programs, or encouragement or justi-
fication of a tradition favoring such methods. 
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This directive was appended b~ a list of 27 existing un-
desirable societies to be aboli.shed as a first step to meet 
2 thi.s directive. By middle of 1946, well over one hundred of 
those societies were banned. 
2. The 27 undesirable societies are as follows: 
1. Dai Nippon Isshin-Kai (Great Japan Renovation Society) 
2. Dai Nippon Koa Renmei (Great Japan Rising Asia 
Alliance) 
3. Dai Nippon Seisanto (Great Japan Production Party) 
4. Dai Nippon Sekisen-Kei (Great Japan True-Hearted 
Society) 
5. Dai Toa Kyokai (Great East-Asia Association) 
6. Daito Juku (Eastern Academy) 
7. Genron Hokokukai (Literary Patriotic Society) 
8. Genyosha (Dark Ocean Society) · 
9. Jikyoku Kaigi Kai (Current Affairs Discussion Society) 
10. Kakumei-So (The House of the Cry of the Crane) 
11. Kenkoku-Kai (National Foundation Society) 
12. Kinkei Gakuin (Golden Pheasant Institute) 
13. Kokuryukai (Black Dragon Society) 
14. Kokusai Hankyo Renmei (Anti-communist League) 
15. Kokusai Seikei Gakkai (International Political 
Economic Society) 
16. Kokusui Taishuto (Ultra-nationalist. party) 
17. Kokutai Yogo Rengo Kai (National State Protection 
League) 
18. Meirin-Kai (High Ethics Society) 
19. Mizuho Club (literally "Fresh Rice Plant") 
20. Sonno Doshikai (Loyalist Comrades Society) 
21. Taika Kai (Great Change Society) 
22. Tenkokai (Rea venly' Action Society) 
23. Toa Renmei. (East Asia League) 
24. Toho Doshikai (Far Eastern Comrades Association) 
25. Toho Kai (Eastern Society} 
26. Yama to Musubi Honsha (Yama to Solidarity Headquarters) 
27. Zen Nippon Seinen Kurabu (All Japan Young Men's Club) 
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CHAPTER VII • 
DECENTRALIZATION OF BIG BUSINESS 
1. How Big Business Handicapped Democracy? The decade 
before Pearl Harbor saw in Japan an alliance of big business 
and military group which formed the central source of power for 
Japan's imperialism and Fascism. The ten major Zaibatsu fam-
ilies whose property was owned by only fifty-six persona, and 
who controlled the assets of the eighty-three holding companies 
constituted virtual business empires in themselves and monop-
1 
olized all the basic industries, banks, and shipping commerce. 
The big business combines were regarded as a big block to 
democracy, because, aside from the military aggression in which 
they had cooperated with the military group in the thirties, 
they had concentrated national wealth, brought pressure on 
snB.ll business, oppressed labor unions, established women slave 
labor, controlled newspapers and cultural organizations Which 
actually fooled the Japanese public. Another significant fact 
is that the Japanese Zaibatsu, unlike the giant concerns of 
Western nations who have an international character and a 
political and economic outlook not necessarily always in 
1. see Major General Frank Macey's report to Far Eastern Com-
mission on Dec. 9, 1948; New York Times, Dec. 10, 1948. 
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conformity with that of the governments of their respective 
countries, have always been closely associated with the working 
out of Japan's economic policy. 
2. Big Business-Go~ernment Alliance. The history of 
Japan shows the long tradition of the close alliance of big 
business combines and the government. Duri.ng the Meiji Restor-
ation when Japan was launched on her career of Westernization, 
the government found it convenient to use certain of the older 
banking and commercial families (especially those who had 
helped to finance political movements that led to the Restora-
tion) as agents for the execution of its economic policy. 
There was at that time no large middle class with financial 
resources and industrial and commercial experience. Intro-
duction of Western methods could, therefore, best be achieved 
by centralizing the process in a few great business families 
which had already considerable experience of large-scale or-
ganization. Close connections were thus established between 
leading statesmen and particular business families. From time 
to time governments, when in financial difficulties, called 
on the Zaibatsu for help, and in return the Zaibatsu acquired 
government properties, received valuable contracts, and earned 
large profits from underwriting government loans. Their 
purely financial interests thus expanded their industrial 
scope. The seven wars in which Japan took part enabled the 
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Zaibatsu to enlarge their sphere, often at the expense of 
other business families. They als o played an important part 
in the development of colonial resources. 
3. Zaibatsu-Militarist Relationships. The Zaibatsu had 
not always agreed with the militaris t s. Their disagreement 
did not concern internal political dictatorship. For a time 
they disagreed with the militarists on the foreign policies 
concerning the nature, not the fact, of aggressive imperialism. 
Prior to 1931 and the invasion of Manchuria, the Zaibatsu op-
posed the militarists. They favored a moderate foreign pol-
icy which would avoid war with the great powers. Their idea 
was economic penetration, not military expansion. For this 
reason they had supported in the thirties the political 
parties and leaders wh ose foreign policy coincided witll their 
2 
views. However, · when the military adventure in Manchuria 
proved to be successful in 1931, the Zaibatsu turned their 
support to the militarists. From that time onward, they con-
verted their industrial and financial empires from a peace-
time to a wartime economy, hoping to reap the rich harvest of 
military conquest by monopolizing the raw materials and new 
' markets in the vast areas of Asia and Pacific islands. Since 
1932 and up to the time of surrender, Japanese major productio 
2. Most of the political party funds, those of Seiyukei and 
Minseito, were contributed by Zaibatsu. 
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was shifted to iron, steel, and machinery. Silk, textiles and 
consumer goods came less and less from the factories. The 
Japanese people, like the Germans under Nazi rule, got less 
butter but more guns. Besides, members of the Zaibatsu were 
prominent in the war councils of the nation, and the existence 
of the middle and small business was entirely at the mercy of 
their policy. 
4. The Work of Decentralization. "The integration of 
these few (families) with government was complete," said 
General MacArthur in a statement, "and their influence upon 
government policies inordinate, and set the course which 
ultimately led to war and destruction."3 For peace as well 
as for democracy, this situation must be utterly changed. The 
first thing to change this situation was to break up the 
Zaibatsu trust group and reorganize the financial and indus-
trial institutions in Japan for which the Supreme Commander 
has devoted a considerable part of the time and resources of 
his staff ever since the first weeks of the occupation. His 
measures, aiming at liquidating the "big-four" of the Zaibatsu 
families--Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Yastrda a!).d Sumitomo--were as 
follows: 
On September 19, 1945, SCAP ordered the Japane.se govern-
ment for a detailed report on all industrial, manufacturing, 
3. Cited by Russell .Brines, £E• £!!., p. 129. 
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and mining companies which did more than one million yen bus-
iness in 1944. 
In October, 1945, the leading Zaibatsu, realizing the 
direction which the Japanese economy was taking under SCAP's 
orders, made tentative, voluntary gestures toward dissolution 
of their empires. 
On November 6, a directive was issued that all the great 
economic combines should be broken up. It was pointed out that 
this would aid Japanese economic development along peaceful, 
democratic lines. Twenty-one major banks and development com-
panies, said SCAP, would be permanently liquidated. All pri-
vate trusts and combines would be dissolved. Undesirable in-
terlocking directorates and inter-company security holdings 
would be eliminated. The employees of the designated com-
panies and the general public were to be encouraged to buy 
shares. Wider ownership of basic industry not only would mili-
tate against a revival of Zaibatsu power, but also would stim-
ulate a wider distribution of income and a more democratic 
ownership of the means of production and trade. 
In February, 1946, SCAP announced that the Diet was pre-
paring legislation which would create a Holding Company Liquida 
tion Commission. The Commission was to study the accounts and 
structures of the big business combines, dispose of their 
properties, and develop plans for their reorganization, all 
in close cooperation with the Supreme Commander. The new law 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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also would prohibit participation in international cartels and 
restrictive international agreements. 
In March, 1946, SCAP issued three directives aimed at 
breaking up the Zaibatsu and preventing their getting back to 
power. These directives added 180 firms and subsidiaries to 
the schedule of restricted concerns. The designated enter-
prises were prohibited from disposing of capital assets or 
other property without action by the Holding Company Liquida-
4 tion Commission through SCAP approval. 
Since big business, and even big business combines, is 
not ostensibly incompatible with American democracy, something 
needs to be said on the thesis that the decentralization of 
Japanese big business was one of the necessary steps of demo-
cratic ' reform. The writer bases his view on the following two 
facts. First the peculiar character of Japanese big business 
and its combines--the Zaibatsu. Their close participation in 
government policies and cooperation with the militarists, as 
discussed above, is not paralleled, at least not in the same 
4. The economic situation of Japan today, three years after the ~1· occupation, is not good for big business, nor for small ones. , 
Big business suffered by the decentralization program 1 The 
small ones suffered by the general production lag which 
resulted from lack of capital and raw materials, labor 
unrest, unstable currency and market. How to develop and 
strengthen the small business, in place of the big ones, 
I 
I 
I 
is a very important question which needs to be answered 
not only for the economic life of the Japanese people, but 
for their democracy as Well. 
I 
I 
II 
i. 
I 
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It is generally recognize:--li -----degree, in American big business. 
that the Zaibatsu was an integral part of the Fascist system 
1 of · the pre-war Japan. Secondly, unlike the United States, 
Japan has no democratic tradition at all; her people have 
I 
I neither experienced nor appreciated the American way of life, 
/ and their relations with the Zaibatsu are certainly not the 
same as those of the American people with J. P. Morgan, Rocke-
feller, or Henry Ford. Therefore, it can be said that the 
I decentralization and liquidation of the Japanese Zaibatsu would 
help Japanese democracy a great deal. 
I 
I 
I 
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PART THREE 
CHANGES IN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 
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CHAPTER VIII 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES 
1. Making The New Constitution. The measures thus far 
discussed were house-cleaning works. It would be still im-
, possible for the Japanese people to build democracy for them-
1 
selves without giving them new new tools. The old tools were 
largely contrary to democratic conception and should be abol-
I 
I 
rl 
ished without hesitation. The most important new tool given Ji 
I by General MacArthur to the Japanese people was, unquestionably, ! 
the new constitution of 1947; since the Meiji Constitution, 
copied from Bismarck Germany, was fundamentally autocratic in 
nature, and should not continue to function. 
Early on October 11, 1945, SCAP told the Japanese Prime 
Minister that the reforms which Japan would have to undertake 
to fulfill the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation "will unques-
tionably involve a liberation of the constitution.n In obed-
ience to this order, the Emperor appointed a Constitutional 
/ Problem Investigation Committee headed by Dr. Joji l~tsumoto, 
I 
a well-known lawyer. The Committee worked out a reform program 
in the following months. At the same time, the various polit-
ical parties drafted their own consti t .utional programs. But 
none of these programs could meet General MacArtbur~s wish 
!because they dared not repeal the Emperor's prerogatives. It 
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seemed evident that the Japanese government and people did not 
want a quick and drastic change in their old political frame-
work. The Prime Minister, Shidehara, declared to the Consti-
tutional Investigation Committee that as a matter of princ i ple 
· the constitution required no amendment, that it was not incon-
sistent with "Japanese democracy", although he admitted that 
there was little question that articles and sections would need 
to be redrafted to meet the present "emergency". The 11 emerg-
en\ yn to which he referred, patently, was the authority of 
SOAP to dictate reform. 
Under these circumstances, it was necessary for SOAP to 
participate directly in the preparation of an entirely new 
draft constitution. It was completed and sent to the Japanese 
government in February, 1946. 1 On March 6, the Emperor pre-
sented this draft constitution to the people, as the official 
government proposal. General MacArthur issued a statement 
1 declaring his full approval and support of the new constitution 
with "deep satisfaction". It was approved in October by the 
I 2 
Diet with only minor changes by an almost unanimous vote. The 
new constitution was promulgated on November 3, 1946, the 
anniversary birthday o£ Meiji, and came into e££ect six months 
1. Dr. D. N. Rowe states that the draft . constitution of March 
6, 1946, which was but slightly amended before promulgation, 
"was entirely the work of the Government Section of SOAP"; 
see his article, 11 The New Japanese Constitution", in Far 
Eastern Survex, Jan. 27, 1947, pp. 16-17. ---
2. Only the Communists abstaining against the retention of the 
Emperor. 
--l 
I 
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later on May 3, 1947. 
2. The Promulgation. The imperial message for the 
promulgation of the new constitution on November 3, 1946, 
reads: 
I have caused this day the constitution of Japan 
to be promulgated. This constitution represents a 
complete revision of the Imperial Constitution. It 
seeks the basis of national reconstruction in the 
universal principle of mankinP.. It has been decided 
upon by the freely expressed will of the people. It 
explicitly stipulates that the people of Japan re-
nounce war of their own accord, that they desire to 
see the realization of a permanent peace founded on 
justice and order throughout the world, and that 
having constant regard to the fundamental human 
rights, they will conduct the national affairs on 
the fixed line of democracy. It is my wish to join 
with my people in directing all our endeavors toward 
due enforcement of the constitution and the building 
of a nation of culture tempered by the sense of 
moderation and3responsibility and dedicated to free-dom and peace. 
I The word "revision" is, in the above message, descriptive ! 
i 
only of the procedure followed. The new constitution is not, 
in fact, a revision, but an entirely new instrument of govern-
ment. Japan's fundamental law has been fundamentally changed. 
Whether or not a corresponding change has occurred in Japan's 
political way of life, thus infusing reality into legality, 
will be discussed in the later chapters. 
3. Form and Models. The new constitution is simply 
I 
I 
1 3. The Japanese Official Gazette, Nov. 3, 1946. 
i 
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entitled "The Constitution of Japan". Throughout the whole 
document such words as "empire" and "imperial" are used leas 
frequently than in the Meiji Constitution. Although the 
sequence of chapters is the same in both, there are added four 
more chapters in the new to make it eleven in total with 103 
articles. The additional chapters are Chapter II, "Renuncia-
tion of War"; Chapter VIII, "Local Self Government"; Chapter 
IX, "Amendment"; Chapter X, "Supreme Law". As for the phrase-
ology, according to H. s. Quigley, the words and sentences of 
the new constitution are naomewhat rhetorical and less def-
inite and legalistic" than those used by Ito Hirobumi and his 
5 
co-drafters of Meiji. 
Aa already noted, the old constitution was modelled on 
the constitution of Bismarck Germany. The new document is 
modelled on the constitutions of the Western powers, particu-
larly the British and American. A sharp contrast is first 
shown in the respective preambles. The preamble of the Meiji 
Cons ti tu ti on says : 
Having, by virtue of the glories of our 
ancestors, ascended the throne of a lineal suc-
cession unbroken for ages eternal •••• we hereby 
promulgate ••• a fundamental law of the state, to 
exhibit the principles by which we are to be 
guided in our conduct •••• 
[ 4. The text of the new constitution, in English translation, 
was issued by the State Department; see The Constitution of 
Japan, State Department Publication 2836;:Far Eastern Series 
1 22. The old constitution is ac~essible in H. s. Quigley, 
Japanese Government and Politics, {N.Y., 1932), Appendix IV. 
5. H.S. Quigley "Japanese Constitution, 1890 and 1947", the 
American Political Science Review, Vol. XLI, No. 5, Oct., 
1947, p. 867. I --
I 
I 
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The rights of sovereignty of the state we have 
inherited from our ancestors and we shall bequeath 
them to our descendants.... · 
The preamble of the 1947 constitution reads, in part: 
We, the Japanese people, acting through our 
duly elected representatives in the National Diet ••• 
do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the 
people and do firmly establish this constitution. 
Government is a sacred trust of the people, the 
authority for which is derived from the people, 
and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the 
people •••• 
The famous words of Abraham Lincoln, "government of the 
people, by the people, and for the people"; are vividly shown I 
II in the last few sentences quoted above. 
4. ~Emperor. ' Article 1 of the 1947 constitution says JI 
"The Emperor shall be the symbol of the state and of the unity 
of the people, deriving his position from the will of the 
people with whom resides sovereign power." This is the 
Emperor's new position. He can be head of the state as lons I 
I 
as the people allow him. He is only a symbol of unity, without ' 
governing power. He has no prerogatives, no religious sanctit~ l 
and no such advisory organs as he had before. In addition, the II 
new constitution provides that his income and expenditure must I 
depend upon the appropriations in the budget passed by the 
Diet. The Imperial House cannot give or receive any property 
without the authorization of the Diet. A.ll these, to be sure, 
are revolutionary changes. 
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5. Renunciation of War. The new constitution is unique 
in the history of Japan and that of the world in its renuncia-
tion of war and of the threat or use of force as a means of 
settling international disputes. The right of self-defense is 
not renounced, but will be ineffective without military forces, 
all types of which "will never be maintained". These pro-
visions, as well as the expression of trust "in the justice 
and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world", read 
strangely in the present world situation. Unless the two 
worlds divided by the United States and Soviet Russia have 
reached a true understanding and reunited into one, in the 
spirit of the United Nations, and unless other nations follow 
the example which Japan has set, it is extremely doubtfUl that 
these provisions can last very long or mean more than mere 
words on paper. 
6. Rights and Duties of ~People. The new constitu-
tion devotes one chapter with 31 articles {Chapter III, Art-
icles 10-40) to guarantee the human rights and freedoms of the 
Japanese people. Most of them are "inviolable and eternal". 
The Meiji Constitution also granted soma of the rights and 
I freedoms to the "subjects", 6 but they were not constitutionally 1 • 
guaranteed, because they were subject to "limitation by law", 
their definition was left to legislation, and their standing 
I 
i 6. Chapter II, Articles 18-32, Meiji Constitution. 
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in·i, the courts was dependent upon it. "The control of a 1: 
bureaucratic, and at times militarist, executive over the Diet, l! 
the broad ordinance poV~er, and the weakness of popular agencies li 
,j 
of expression, contributed to make the old bill of rights 
7 
rather an ideal than practice". 
Since the proplem of human rights and freedoms forms the 
center of Western democracy and civilization, and holds the I 
I 
spiritual bas is of all democratic reforms engineered by SOAP 1
1 
in post-war .Japan, it is worthWhile to discuss in detail in the ll 
next chapter, "Japanese Bill of Rights''· jl 
7. The All Powerful National Diet. 
(1) Highest 'Organ: 
The Diet under the new constitution has a position and 
power which it did not have under the old one. The new Diet 
is "the highest organ of state power, and •••• the sole law-
making organ of the state 11 (Art. 41), whereas the old Diet 
merely exercised part of the legislative powers; the Emperor's 
prerogatives, the broad ordinance power, actually ' reduced the 
old Imperial Diet into a mere consultative organ whose function 
8 
was nothing but to "consent". 
(2) Cabinet Responsible to Diet: 
II 
1: 
I 
I 
I 
Under the old constitution, the Premier and the ministers I 
-7-.-H-.-s-.-Quigley, "Japan's Constitutions, 1890 and 1947", II![ . 
.2.£• cit., p. 970. 
8. See Chapter I, Articles 5, 8, Meij! Constitution. 
I 
I' 
~J 
of state were appointed nominally by the Emperor"' (Art. 10). 
In practice, however, only the Premier was appointed by the 
Emperor upon the advice of the genro, or "elder statesmen", 
or the Imperial Household Ministry; while the rest of the min-
g 
is ters of state were appointed by the Premier. As to the 
question of to whom they are responsible, the old •-coruititution 
replies rather ambiguously. Article 55 reads: "The respective 
Ministers of State shall give their advice to the Emperor, and 
be responsible for it. 11 Although some of the Japanese writers 
and professors have been inclined to regard this clause as an 
10 
"intentionally political sphinx" they all agree with Ito's 
interpretation that the ttrninis ters are directly responsible to 
11 
the Emperor." Therefore tre Premier and the ministers were 
neither appointed by, nor responsible for, the Diet. They were 
not obliged to resign upon vote of want of confidence. 
Today under the new constitution, the "Cabinet shal·l be 
collectively responsible to the Dietn in the exercise of 
executive power (Art. 66). The Prime Minister shall be desig-
nated from among the members of the Diet by a resolution of the 
9. H. s. Quigley, Japanes~ Government 
Co., N.Y. and London, 1932; p. 85. 
10. H. S. Quigley, Japanese Government 
p. 85, notes: 11, 12, 13. 
• 
and Politics, The Century li 
and Politics, .2.12.• ~·, 1 
11. Ito, Hirobumi, Commentari~ ~ the Constitution of the 
Em5ire of Japan, translated by Ito Miyoji (2nd. Ed. Tokyo), 
19 6, p. 94. 
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Diet (Art. 67). The Ministers of State shall be app ointed by 
the Prime Minister; however, "a ma.j ority of them l111is t be mem-
bers of the Diet 11 (Art. 68). Resignation of the Cabinet, or 
appeal to .the country through election, must follow a vote of 
want of confidence by the House of Representatives {Art. 69). I 
This strict subord ination of the executive branch to the legis-1 
lative is an important democratic feature which has generally 
existed in the constitutions of Western countries such as 
Britain and . France. 
(3) Hold Purse String!~_: 
The Diet under the new constitution holds freely the 
purse strings of the nation as contrasted with the powerless-
ness to control the government income and expenditures under 
the old constitution. The annual budget, according to both 
constitutions, should' be presented to the Diet for 11 consent 11 
12 
or "approval". However, in the old system, the taxes exist-
ing prior to the constitutional era were continued specific-
ally by the constitution (Art. 63), and "all such administra-
tive fees or other revenue having the nature of compensation" 
were determined by the government without reference to the 
Diet (Art. 62). On the side of expenditure, the old Imperial 
Diet could not change the sum already appropriated to the 
Imperial House (Art. 66); neither reject nor reduce, without 
------------------
12. See Art. 5 of the Law of Election of 1925 and Chapter 
IV, A.rt. 44 of tl::e l947Constituti0ii.-
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I /the concurrence of the government, 11 those ·already fixed ex-
lpenditures based by the Constitution upon the powers appertain-
! ling to the Emperor, and such expenditures as may have arisen 
'by the effect of law, or that appertain to the legal obliga-
tions of the governmentn (Art. 67). Moreover, 11 if the Diet did 
not vote on the Budget, or when the Budget has not been brought 
I 
!into actual existence, the government shall carry out the 
Budget of the preceding year" (Art.· 71). In a word, the old 
purse strings were in the hands of the government, not in the 
Imperial Diet. 
The new constitution provides tba.t all imposition of new 
taxes or modification of old ones, together with all money ex-
, pended, must be authorized by the Diet (Art. 84-85). "All prop-
erty of The Imperial Household smll belong to the State", and 
all expenses of the Imperial Household shall be appropriated by 
the Diet in the annual budget" (Art. 88). It is constitution-
ally forbidden to use public property or money to support any 
/ religion (!rt. 89). The Cabinet is accountable to report at 
I regular intervals and at least annually on the state of IlS.;tiona 
I finance to the Diet and to the people (Art. 91). 
I 
I ( 4) Bicallieral·, , but Di:fference in ~erahip and Power: 
1 Both the old Imperial Diet and the new Japanese National 
I 
I Diet consist of two houses. They are called House of Peers 
I 
il and House of Representatives in the old Diet, and House of 
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Councillors and House of Representatives in the new. Members 
of the "lower" house under both constitutions are elected by 
the people for a term of four years. But the voters under the 
old election law were limited only to nma.le subjects over 25 
years of age u, whereas the voters under the new constitution 
cannot be discriminated ttbecause of race, creed, sex, social 
13 
status, family origin, property or income". · 
The difference lies, particularly, in the membership and 
authority of the "upper" house. The old House of Peers was 
made up of s 1x classes of members; (A) Princes of the blood, 
I (B) princes am marquises, (C) representatives of the three 
I lower order (counts, vis counts, and barons), (D) imperial 
appointees (three classes): (a) imperial nominees selected 
for service to the state or for erudition, (b) representatives 
of the highest taxpayers, and (c) representatives of the Im-
perial Academy. 14 The first two classes sat by hereditary 
right. The third was elected by their respective orders and 
I 
sat for seven years. ~mperial appointees for merit or learning 1 
I 
were in practice selected by the Premier though they received I 
I 
I 
I , J formal appointments from the Emperor. They were entitled to 
sit for life. Representatives of the high taxpayers were I 
II 
elected by men who paid 300 yen or more in direct tax upon land~~ 
13. Ibi£. 1 Art. 44 of the 1947 Constitution. 
14. H. S. Quigley, Japanese Government and Politics, ££• cit., 
Appendix VIII, P• 361. 
I 
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II indus try, or commerce. Each prefecture was entitled to one 
such member, the more populous prefectures to two. Four mem-
bera were elected from 
the Imperial Academy. 
among the one hundred learned men in 
Members of the two groups last mentioned I 
received their formal appointment from the Emperor and sat for 
a even years. These six classes well represented the aristo-
cratic, conservative and higher elements of the Japanese 
society. They formed the House of Peers which exercised the 
same power as the House of Representatives in law-making, so 
aa to "preserve an equilibrium between political powers, to 
rea train the undue influence of poli tica 1 parties, to check the 1 
I 
evil tendencies of irresponsible discussions, to secure the 
stability of the constitution, to be an instrument for main-
taining harmony between the governing and the governed," as 
15 
Ito said. 
Both houses of the new Japanese Diet are sharply differ-
ent from those of the old in membership and authority. Mem-
bers of the House of Councillors under the new constitution are 
as popularly elected as those of the House of Representatives 
(Art. 43). Their term of office is six years, half of the 
members is to be elected every three years (Art. 46}. In 
authority, the new lower house is far superior to the upper--
a distinctive feature and a revolutionary change in the Japan-
ese constitution. It can be said that the new House of 
~---------------------------
15. Ito, ~entariea, PP• 69-72. 
I 
I 
I 
-46-
! 
I 
I 
~---__Jj-
Representatives is the highest am most powerful organ in 
Japan today. This significance is well illustrated by the 
following articles: 
Art. 59: A bill which is passed by the House 
of Representatives, and upon which the House of 
Councillors makes a desision different from that of 
the House of Representatives, becomes a law when 
passed a second time by the House of Representatives 
by a ma jority of two-thirds or more of the members 
present 
Failure by the House of Councillors to take 
final action within sixty days after receipt of a 
bill passed by the House of Representatives, time 
in recess excepted, may be determined by the House 
of Representatives to constitute a rejection of 
the said bill by the House of Councillors. 
Art. 60: Upon consideration of the budget, 
when the House of Councillors makes a decision 
different from that of the House of Representatives, 
and when no agreement can be reached even through 
a joint committee of both Houses, provided for by 
law, or in the case of failure by the House of Coun ... 
cillors to take final action within thirty days, the 
period of recess excluded, after the receipt of the 
budget passed by the House of Representatives, the 
decision of the House of Representatives shall be 
the dec is ion of the Diet. · 
Art. 61: The •••• preceding article applies also 
to the Diet approval required for the conclusion of 
treaties. 
Art. 67: The Prime Minister shall be designated 
from the members of the Diet by a resolution of the 
Diet •••• 
If the House of Representatives and the House of 
Councillors disagree and if no agreement can be 
reached even through a joint committee of both Houses 
provided for by law, or the House of Councillors fails 
to make designation within ten days, exclusive of the 
period of recess, after the House of Representatives 
has made designation, the decision of the House of 
Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet. 
-47-
-48-
-----=======~======~-~-~-===================== =============~==================~======== 
'1 The reader might ask why the new upper house should sub-
! 
/ ordinate to tbe lower house in view of the fact that both are 
popular elected and "representative of all the people", and 
that there is no more peerage under the new constitution. To 
answer this question, Prof. Quigley's comment is worthwhile 
quoting: 
It is in accord, however, with the expectation 
that the new upper house, although popularly elected, 
would tend to carry over the conservatism of its pred-
ecessor. As in Great Britain, where the Cabinet was 
and is responsible to the House of Commons, it follows 
logically that the House of Councillors, like the House 
of Lords, should be unable to veto Cabinet proposals. 
But a consultative house, combining the valuable at-
tributes of the old Privy Council and House of Peers 
and deprived of their crippling authority, is an es-
sential feature of successful parliamentarism in 
Japan.l6 
8. Cabinet Assuming Sole Executive Power. The new con-
stitution vests all the executive power in the Cabinet. It 
not only deprives the Empero.r of all his governing power, but 
also abolishes a group of agencies which have exercised execu-
tive power other than the Cabinet under the Meiji Constitution. 
Those agencies abolished included the Supreme Command, a com-
posite of the military and naval agencies; the Privy Council; 
the genro or "elder statesmen"; and the Imperial Household 
Ministry. The repudiation of the Suprem9 Command is particu-
larly s1gnif1ca nt because the Japanese history shows the 
Supreme Command actually exercised its own foreign policy 
----------------------------
16. H. s. Quigley, "Japan's Constitutions: 1890 and 1947", 
.£E• cit., p. 871. 
i -49-
__ l 
during the fifteen years before the surrender in most cases 
without reference to the Cabinet. Typical example was the 
Sino.Japanese War of July 7, 1937 when Prince Konoye became 
Prime Minister, who in his memoirs pleaded: 11 I was in the dark 
as to how and where army opinion was formed. The Cabinet moved 
at the beck and call of the intangible shadow of the military 
comma.nd.n 17 The position of Konoye in this respect was 
strictly consonant with that of his predecess ora. Reijiro 
Wakatsuki, Premier in 1931, testified at the Tokyo trial of 
SOAP Military Tribunal that he was kept unaware where respon-
18 
sibility lay for the attack on Manchuria. Kijuro Shidehara, 
a post-surrender Premier and Foreign Minister of 1931, while 
admitting tm t the Government knew the Kwantung Army intended 
to attack Manchuria, affirmed that it had no authority to in-
quire into the plans. 19 Tsuyoshi Inukai, Premier in the deci-
siva months between December 1931 and May 1932, was constrained 
to appeal to the Empero,r to order the sus pens ion of the Man-
1·churian operations. 20 He had tried to treat with the Chinese 
through a secret envoy, but t"he coded message~ to Tokyo had 
been intercepted and deciphered by the Army and the plan 
17. Prince Konoye 'a memoir was prepared from his diaries just I 
before his suicide. A translation in part appeared in the 
Nippon Times, 8 and 9 April 1946, and it has been discussed 1 
in the New York Times, 21-29 December, 1946. , 
18. The New-YorkTimes, June 29, 1946. 1j 
19. Ibid-;---Juile27, 1946 • II 
20. Ibid, J une 29, 1946. This evidence was given by Ken Inukai 
the sonc and secretary of the murdered Premier. i 
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1 frustrated. These stories tell us how the old Cabinet was 
I rendered p~erless to exercise its executive power by t~t 
j· irrational political system of Supreme Command and by pro-
l visions of the old constitution tba.t the Ministers of Army and 
Navy must be a General and an Admiral. It eventually resulted 
in military domination of government which led blindly the 
nation to war and catastrophe. 
The new constitution, as mentioned above, shall never 
maintain armed forces of any type. There is no prohibition 
on ministries of War, Navy or national defense, and other 
agencies of military administration. On the contrary, the 
implication in A.rticle 66--nthe Prime Minister and other mini-
sters of state must be civilianstt--is that military ministries 
may be established. However, there is no provision for the 
exercise of military authority outside of the Cabinet, inc 
which executive power is solely vested. Thus the military con-
. trol of government could hardly be repeated in future Japanese 
I history. 
I 
9. Judicial Independ~ and Review. The judiciary 
under the old constitution had independence theoretically. The 
courts have been recognized as a separ~te branch of government. 1 
The judges have been men of ability, integrity, and learning, 
and constitutionally protected from · executive interference and 
·removal (Art. 58). However, the cour:ts were functioning on 
I ~r~· New York Times, June 28, 1946·----============tr 
I I 
II I 
I 
behalf of the Emperor, the repository of judicial power (Art. 
57). Their independence was not complete because in practice 
judges were inclined to defer to the administration, a heritage 
from feudal times, and because they were under the authority 
of the minister of justice Who made the rules of judicial 
procedure, made appointments and recommended promotions, 
directed the work of the procurators, and initiated prosecution 
in a 11 criminal cases. 
This is not the case under the new constitution, by which 
the judiciary assumes complete independence today. All the 
judicial power is vested in a Supreme Court and in the inferior 
courts (Art. 76). They are no longer under the authority of 
the Ministry of Justice. A.ll the judicial procedure and prac-
tice, matters relating to attorneys, the internal discipline of 
the courts and the administration of judicial affairs are de-
cided and directed by the Supreme Court (Art. 77). The Chief 
Judge of the Supreme Court is appointed by the Emperor upon the 
designation of the Cabinet, other members of the Court are 
appointed by the Cabinet; all these appointments shall be re-
viewed by the people at the first general election of the House 
of Representatives following their appointments and at ten 
year intervals thereafter (Art. 79). Judges of the lesser 
courts are appointed by the Cabinet for ten-year terms from a 
list of persons nominated by the Supreme Court and may be re-
appointed (Art. 80). Judges shall be bound only by the 
I I 
i I 
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J constitution and the laws, and removed only by the impeachment 
of the Diet (Art. 76 & 78). The Supreme Court is vested with 
power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, 
regulation or official act (Art. 81). This judicial review is 
definitely copied from the constitution of the United States. 
10. Local Autonomy. The chief executive and legislative 
assembly of the local government under , the new constitution are 
elected by direct popular vote within the community (Art. 93). 
stitution did not mention the local government, whose business 
. ' 
I was entirely under the control of the Minis try of Home Affairs 
of the central government. 
11. Amendment. The amendment of the old constitution 
was to be initiated by an Imperial Order and submitted to the 
Imperial Diet in which two-thirds of the Whole number of mem-
bers must be present in debate and a vote of two-thirds of 
those present was needed, (Art. 73). In .the new constitution, 
the amendment is to be i ni tia ted by the Diet, through a con-
curring vote of two-thirds or more of all the members of each 
house and thereupon be submitted to the people for ratification. 
The ratification needs a majority vote in a special referendum ,: 
or a special election (Art. 96). I 
In summary, we must acknowledge that the new constitution 
is one of the mast liberal documents in the history of the 
world. It is the combined product of the British and American 
constitutions, the American Bill of Rights, and the United 
Nations Charter. The idea of the supremacy of the lower house 
is certain:Ly British, while that of the judicial review is 
apparently American. The renunciation of war as a national 
policy, together with the expression of trust 11 in the justice 
and faith of the peace -loving peoples of the world 11 , is really 
the true spirit of the United Nations. Therefore, it is 
evident that the new constitution of Japan is not only new to 
the Japanese, but also not made by the Japanese themselves. 
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CHAPTER IX. 
THE . "BILL OF RIGHTS" 
In the preceding chapter we have noted the guarantee of 
human rights and freedoms as a new feature of the 1947 con-
stitution. Since this is the most important criterion of democ 
racy and t.be basis of Western way of life, it seems fair and 
necessary to mention all General MacArthur 1 s efforts on that 
score in Japan. It is highly valuable, particularly in view 
of the fact that the Japanese, habituated to autocratic tradi-
tion for more than two thousand years, have never enjoyed, nor 
understood, nor treasured such things as human rights and free-
dom. 
1. The "Bill of Rights It--Negative. As early as on 
October 4, 1945, SCAP issued a directive which was a virtual 
"bill of rights". It informed the Japanese government what it 
should do "in order to remove restrictions on political, civil, 
and re11gious liberties and discriminations on the ground of 
race, nationality, creed, and political opinion." In compliance 
with this directive, the Japanese government. was asked to take 
immediate actions on the following: 
(1) Abrogation and suspension of all laws, 
decrees, orders, ordinances and regulations which 
restrict the freedom of thought, religion, assembly, 
I 
_I 
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and speech (including the unrestricted discussion 
of tbe Emperor, the Imperial Institution, am the 
governm:lnt); which favor or operate against any 
person by reason of race, nationality, creed, or 
political opinion; and which establish or maint~ln 
restrictions on the collection and dissemination 
of informa tion.l 
(2) Release of all persons detained, imprisoned 
or kept under "protection or surveillance" by October 
10, 1945 because of offending the laws and decrees 
above mentioned. 
( 3) Abolishing all organizations or ~gencies 
created to carry out the above provisions. 
(4) Remove from office and employment the 
Minis tar of Home Affairs, and all the chiefs of 
police bureaus in the Ministry of Home Affairs, in 
all big cities and prefectures; as well as all the 
personnel of the Protection and Surveillance Com-
mission and its stations under the Ministry of 
Justice. None of these persons will be re-appointed 
to assume the same functions. 
(5) Prohibition of all the physical punishment 
and mistreatment of all persons detained or imprisoned 
under any laws and decrees. All such persons will 
receive at all times ample sustenance. 
(6) Report before October 15, 1945, in detail 
of all actions taken to comply with this directive. 
2. The "Bill of Rights"--Positive. The above step was 
taken to protect the funQa.mental human rights and freedoms, 
but on the negative side. On the positive, however, there is 
inserted in the new constitution a chapter (III) to guarantee 
1. For details of the laws and decrees designated for abroga-
tion, see OccupatiO£ of Japan, pp. 94-96. 
2. For the organs and agencies specified for immediate abolish-
ment, see Occupation of Japan, pp. 96-97. 
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these rights and freedoms. The constitution provides that all 
the people shall be respected as individuals and be equal under 
law. Their rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi-
ness shall, to the extent that it does not interfere with the 
public welfare, be the supreme consideration in legislation 
and in other government affairs • Every person has inalienable 
rights in owning and holding property, in election or dismissal 
of public officials, in petition, suit for redress; and con-
stitutionally guaranteed freedom of thought, speech, religion, 
assembly, privacy, emigration, nationality, and academic re-
3 
search. All people have the right to maintain a minimum 
standard of wholesome and cultural living, to receive an equal 
education correspondent to their ability, the right and the 
obligation to work (child labor forbidden), as well as the 
4 
workers' right to organize and collectively bargain. No 
arrest can be made without warrant or without the person de-
tained being informed at once of the charges against him. No 
infliction of torture is to be put on a criminal, no due proce~l 
I 
of law is to be denied to any criminal, no person is to be com-
pelled. to testify against himself, and no one to be convicted 
or punished in cases where the only proof against him is his 
own confess ion. 5 
3. The Constituti~ of Japan, (1947), Art. 20, 21, 23, 29. 
4. Ibid, Art. 25, 26, 27, 28. 
5. Ibid, Art. 34-38. 
i_._ 
-56-
I 
I L __ _ 
As a whole, it seems quite apparent that both the Amer-
ican 11Bill of Rights u and the United Nations Charter have in-
fluenced the drafters of the Japanese bill of rights tr.emen-
dously. 
I 
I 
II 
_____ j 
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CHAPTER X 
POLITICAL PARTIES 
I 
Democratic government is not only represented by a dem-
1 ocratic constitution but also by party politics. In the pre-
l war Japan, although the constitution was autocratic in nature, 
there were nevertheless activities by political parties, par-
ticularly colorful in the twenties. Those parties, the leading 
ones of which were the Seiyukai and Minseito, were mercilessly 
put down by the military-Zaibatsu alliance in the thi r ties. 
I They were :finally wiped out first by Prince Konoye 1 s Imperial 
I Rule Assistance Association in 1940, and later in 1942 by 
General Tojo's Great Japan Political Association, a rubber-
stamp organization of the wartime government. The Socialists 
and Communis ta were either put into prison or driven under-
ground. It would be safe to say that there were no political 
J par ties in activity at the time of surrender. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
The Great Japan Political Association, which included 
377 out of the 466 members of the House of Representatives at 
the date of surrender, was dissolved in August 1945. It was 
under SCAP's encouragement after occupation that the new J@p-
aneae political parties mushroomed. Early in Dec. 1945 about 
sixty political parties were organized. The biggest ones, five 
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in number, are now active on the Japanese political stage. 
1. Democratic Liberal Partz. The first of the "big-five" 
is the Democratic Liberal Party, formerly known as Liberal 
Party, Which consists of the pre-war members of Seiyukai and 
represents also the conservative bureaucratic and economic 
interests. The party is usually regarded by foreigners and its 
opponents as the extremely rightist, conservative, reactionary, , 
and controlled by 70-year-olds. 1 Its · conservatism was well 
represented by the record that it neither favored the 1945 land 
reform act on the ground that it was too radical, nor welcomed 
the new constitution in believing that the old constitution 
2 
required only functional and not basic changes. Politically 
it strongly supported the emperor system. Economically it 
favored laissez faire 3 without restriction on the big business. 
In fact it is not "liberal" at all although it is so termed. 4 
The party was originally formed by Hatoyama Ichiro, a 
Seiyukai politician who had held the posts of chief secretary 
1. Summati~ of Non-military Activities in Japan, April, 1948. 
2. Kenneth E. Colton:-wPre-war Political Influence in Post-war 
Conservative Parties 11 , in American Political Science Review, 
Vol XLII, No. 5, October, 1948, pp. 942-943. 
3. The Party's Campaign platform in the 1947 election. 
4. The name "Liberal" was selected for two major reasons, the 
lesser being its pleasing sound in Occupation ears. More 
fundamental was its evocative appeal to early Seiyukai 
history in its identification with the Itagaki Taisuke 
Li beral Party founded in 1881 in the crusading days of 
Meiji politics. As the Kenseito, it helped to form the 
Seiyukai in 1900. See H. S. Quigley: Japanese Government 
and Politics, ££• cit., pp. 201-211. 
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in tbe Tanaka Cabinet ( 1927-29) and minister of education in 
the .Inukai and Saito cabinets of 1931-34. He began to combine 
the constitutional parliamentarians and the machine politicians 
of the pre-war Seiyukai in September, 1945. · His work was com-
pleted on November 9, 1945 when the Japan Liberal Party was 
launched when he was elected president and Kono Ichiro chief 
secretary. When the second ' post-war Diet opened on Nov. 26, 
1945, the party boasted 46 Diet members and second place among 
poli ti ca 1 parties • 
The party was badly hit by the SOAP purge order of Jan-
uary 4, 1946. It reduced immediately the party's Diet member-
ship from 46 to 18, and late~, its application to rescreen the 
elected Diet nembers between April and June, 1946, deprived the 
party of the first place in the newly elected Diet. The major 
blow, of course, was tbe purge of Hotoyama Ichiro who was on 
the verge of being ns.med pri:n:e minister, on May 3, 1946. 5 This 
loss stunned the party. It was left without any acceptable 
leader who could link the two party elements, tbe constitutiona 
parliamentarians on the one hand and the party machinists on 
the other. After some ten days of confusion the party named 
5. Hatoyama was the only politician of national stature purged 
by a special SOAP directive. He was cited for his associa-
tion with the notorious Baron General Tanaka, his restraints 
upon the schools as minister o f education, his book of Euro-
pean travel, his 1942 election-statement. His supporters 
were so- loyal to him that they contended that the purge over-
looked his consistent opposition to military regimes between 
1936 and 1943, his support of constitutional government, and 
his parliamentary record over the same period. See K. E. 
Colton, ££• cit., p. 946, note 24. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
l shigeru Yoshida as Hatoyama's temporary successor, and Ono 
Bambuko to take Kono Ichiro's place as the party's new chief 
6 
secretary. 
7 Yoshida accepted the party leadership reluctantly. He 
was not a man of partisan politics, nor was he interested in 
them. He was a career diplomat and one time Ambassador to the 
Court of St. James. Because of being pro-Britain and advocat-
ing an early end to the war he was put into prison by Kempei-
tai in 1943. His anti~militarism does not mean he is a lib-
eral. On the contrary he is the most conservative politician 
Japan has ever had in her post-war history. He is a devout 
servant of the emperor and big business, and a firm believer 
in the old Japanese system. 8 It is perhaps, due to his ultra-
conservatism and not due to his talent for organization that 
he has gathered together all the Japanese rightist forces and 
led his party into the most powerful political group today. 
2. Democratic Party. The second is the Democratic 
Party. It includes many membeps of the pre-war Minseito and 
6. Keno Ichiro was also purg ed in June, 1946. Ono Bambuko, 
his successor, trained in the Hara Kei school of fierce 
partisanship, helps Yoshida in this respect. 
7. Yoshida accepted the position on three conditions, all of 
which posited that his occupancy would be temporary. He 
was not elected president until August 18, 1946. 
8. Yoshida 1 s wife is the daughter of the late Count Nobukai 
Makino, the Emperor's closest adviser. His son-in-law is 
Tagakichi As o, who is a wealthy coal mtne proprietor. 
Yoshida's connections with the Imperial Palace and big 
business may serve partly to explain his conservatism. 
S ee N . Y . Times, January 25, 1949. 
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has connections with the bureaucracy, the business community, 
and the imperial household. Like the Democratic Liberal 
.Party, it is conservative; but unlike the former, it is not 
reactionary. It pursues a middle-of-the-road policy which was 
exemplified by its 1947 platform--"modified capitalism". In · 
explaining tl:fl conception of "modified capitalism", the party 
leader and then Prime Minister, Hitoshi Ashida, told the House 
of Counc:tllors on March 25, 1948: 11Capitalism, as it appeared 
economically in the 19th century, was 'a ruling power of 
wealth'. It is the purpose of modified capitalism to restrict 
the ruling power, to render equal status to all who are en-
gaged in industry by correcting the inequality between the 
wealthy and the poor, and to operate social economy by mutual 
cooperation. This means that the welfare of the individual 
is considered a problen1 for society as a whole; i.e., the in-
terests of the general consumer, not those of the individual 
9 
producer, are first considered under the modified capitalism." 
The party began its formation on September 14, 1945, 
when the Great Japan Political Association was dissolved. It 
received many members from that Association comprising the 
9. Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan. April, 
1948, P• 7T; 
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pre-war Minseito, the Anti-Hatoyama Seiyukai, the pure Kuhara 
10 Seiyukai, and those elected to the Diet for the first time 
in 1942. By November 16, sufficient agreement had been 
reaChed among the diverse elements to launch and officially 
term the party as the Progressive Party. It was so large a 
party that it claimed 288 Diet members among the total 466 in 
the House of Representatives. 11 On December 18, Machida Chuji, 
last president of the dissolved pre-war Minseito, was elected 
as president of the newly established Progressive Party. 12 
Its chief secretary's post was held by another Minseito, 
Tsurumi Yusuke, from the beginning. Since those with Seiyukai 
inheritance were no more than twenty percent within the party, 
its Minseito potential was clear. 
The purge directive of Jan. 4, 1946, all but extinguished 
the Progressive Party. Of the 270 Diet members on January 1, 
only 32 remained eligible on March 1.13 
10. The Seiyukai finally split, after prolonged factional 
strife, in February 1939. The largest group of 96, led 
by Nakajima Chikuhei, was anti-Hatoyama. The smaller group 
of 71, led by Kuhara Fusanosuke, was pro-Hatoyama.. There 
were 11 neutrals. See Kenneth E. Colton, .Q£• cit., p. 941. 
11. Of these 288 Diet members claimed by the Progressive Party 
Minseito, 32%; Seiyukai, 20%; the large plurality, 45%, 
·were the 116 firs·t-term members of 1942, who had had no 
party aff iliations. See Summation of Non-Military Activ-
ities in Japan, Dec. 1945. 
12. New York Times, Dec. 19, 1945. 
13. About 18 resigned from Diet betwe en Dec. 1 and 17, 1945. 
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Those left were all who had neither held party posts in 
::;a:::~:::n~raH:::v:~o::r:::et:~::;:e:0:h:e:::::h::d0:orced l 
it, for political survival, to rely on the older, deeper, 
proved sources of Minseito organization which had been highly 
successful in tbe 1936 elections. 14 
Machida Chuji was removed by the purge from the Party 
leaders hip on January 5, 1946, only two weeks after his in-
stallation. His successor was Baron Kijuro Shidehara, moderate 
foreign minister at the time of' the Manchurian Incident in 
19.31 and Prime Minister during the first winter of occupation. 
The par~ was revitalized and reorganized later by 
Hi tos hi A.shi da in the spring of 1947. Under his leadership the 
party's platform was moved from the early extreme right and 
conservative which had shown no difference from that of the 
Liberal Party, 15 into a middle road or moderate--the "modified 
capitalism", as discussed above. He changed furthermore, the 
party's name into the present Democratic Party on March 31, 
1947. 
Like Shigeru Yoshida, Hitoshi Ashida was also a career 
diplomat who served in minor embassy pos i tiona in Turkey and 
14. Japan Year Book, 1937, p. 345. 
15. The Party's platform in 1945 wholeheartedly supported the 
emperor system as well as the old constitution. See 
Asahi Shimbun, Nov. 17, 1945. 
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Belgium up to 1932. He was elected in l93a to The Diet and 
served there up to 1940. During the same period he was also 
president of the newspaper Japan Times which fact was cited 
by some of his political op ponents as proof that he should be 
purged because that newspaper belonged to the Japanese Foreign 
Office and was naturally the vehicle of its infla.mma tory prop-
16 
aganda. 
Ashida gave up the Party leadership following the res-
ignation of his Cabinet on October 15, 1948 because of corrup-
tion involved in members of his Cabinet. He was replaced by 
Ken Inukai, son ·of the premi e r assassinated by the rightist 
radicals in 1932, and one of the orig inal organizers of the 
Democratic Party. He was released from the purge category on 
July 20, 1948. His rightist inclination plus the party's 
crushing defeat in the last election possibly split the party 
into right and left to join the Liberals and the Socialists 
and thus end the party in post-war Japanese history. 
3. Social Democratic Party. The Social Democratic 
Party represents the small middle class, professional and 
white collar work ers, wage earners and farmers. It favors 
state control as preliminary to nationalization of basic in-
dustries arrl sociallegislation. 17 It derives its strength 
16. New York 'rimes, Feb. 22, 1948. 
1'7. The party's 194'7 platform, which demanded, among other 
things, state control of the coal, iron and steel, and fer 
tilizer industries, preparatory to state ownership. 
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considerably from a close affiliation with the J~panese Feder-
ation of Labor, and the salary and wa ge earners among the pop-
ula tiona in the big cities • 
The development of the Japanese Social Democratic Party 
can be briefly analyzed into four periods. The first period 
covers from V-J day to Apri 1, 1946, during which the party 
completed its organization. In November, 1945, the Social 
· Democratic Party was f ormerly organized by a realignment of 
the remnants of the pre -war Social Mass Party, the Farmers' 
Party and the Laborers' Party. As compared with the two con-
servative parties .mentioned above, the Socialist appeared 
weaker, V'lith only 17 members in the Diet in December, 1945. It 
had no opposition power whatsoever in the parliament. However, 
the deteriorating economic situation following the surrender 
contributed to the gradual growth of the Socialist's strength. 
The second period covers April, 1~46--June, 1947, during 
which the party became . the opposition following the winning of 
92 members in th~ Diet as a result of the first post-war 
18. The opposition to the draft constitution within the Diet 
was not carried out, althought the left-wing Socialists, as 
the Communists, were strongly against preserving the Tenno 
(emperor) system; partly because the draft-constitution 
was in reality a liberal document notwithstanding, main-
taining the Emperor as a symbol, partly because it is 
generally recognized that .the original draft bad actually 
been prepared by occupation authorities and that conse-
quently general acceptance was demanded by force of 
circumstance. See D. N. Rowe, "The New Japanese Consti-
tution" Far Eastern Survey, Jan. 27, 1947. 
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election sponsored by SCAP in April, 1946. In alliance with 
some Deroocrats and Communists, it cruld bar the draft consti-
18 tution from two-thirds ma.jori ty passage w'i thin the Diet. 
Outside the Diet it penetrated into the labor and masses and 
united the left-wing political forces to stage the giant "Down 
with Shidehara 11 demonstration on April 7, 1946, and ''Down with 
Yoshida" rallies throughout the nation on December 17, 1946. 
A general strike was ordered by left-wing Socialists (and 
Communists) on January 31, 1947, only to be called off by 
General MacArthur 1 s intervention. 
The third period, May, 1947--February, 1948, saw the 
Socialist Party in power. Following its emergence as the 
biggest· party in the 1947 election, the first Socialist co-
alition government under the Premiership of Tetsu Katayama, 
Socialist leader, appeared in the Japanese history. However, 
because of the intra-party strife, the tendency to sacrifice 
i t s own ideals and platform for the purpose of winning the 
19 Democrats' support, as well as its inability to solve the 
critical economic problems, the Socialist Cabinet fell after 
about ten months in office. With it i'ell the waning prestige 
of the Party. 
19. The Democrats entered the Cabinet on condition that the 
Socialists would cancel "any wild new planning" which 
refers to the latter's proposal for state control of key 
industries, freezing the "new yen", and ' stopping the 
interest payments on war bonds. See Russell Brines, 
2£• cit., pp. 209-210. 
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The fourth period, from February, 1948 to the present, 
saw the Socialist Party in decline. The laborers, already 
disappointed with the Socialist Party, 20 turned their support 
to the Contnunists. This resulted in the Party's crushing de-
feat in the 1949 election. 
Throughout the Party 1 s history, there was constant intra-
party conflict between right and left wings. The left wing 
always associated with the Communists while the right usually 
cooperated with the moderate conservatives (the Democrats). 
The Communist repeatedly asked the Socialist for a united "pop-
ular front" against the conservative regime so as to ward off, 
as they claimed, the possible mass unemployment likely to re-
sult from industrial reorganization, to protect farmers from 
heavy taxes, and to oppose the government's oppressive policy 
toward mass demonstrations. This proposal, however, did not · 
materialize, mainly due to the resistance of the right wing 
Socialists. 
The Socialist leader, Katayama Tetsu, elected chairman 
of his party's central executive committee in the fall of 1946, 
20. Labor's disappointment with Katayama's Cabinet began in 
the fall of 1947. The Nippon Times of Nov. 14, 1947, 
reported the warning given by Kan Makoto of the NCIO 
(National Congress of Industrial Organization), on Novem-
ber 12, to 100,000 union members assembled in the Imperial 
Plaza. Kan stated tha. t labor had pi•eviously gathered in 
the Plaza to support the Katayama Cabinet, but that if con-
ditions did not improve, a mass meeting for the Cabinet 
overthrow might sometime be necessary. 
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was more a scholar than a politician. Graduated from Tokyo 
Imperial University in 1912 as a specialist in German law, 
he for many years practiced law in his native prefecture 
Wakayama and in Tokyo. His relation with the labor movement 
began in 1919 when he opened a legal consultant office in 
Tokyo, specializing in labor cases. He was also an educator, 
a Christian, and an author of law and politics. 21 He was 
elected to the Diet three times during the l930)s and remained 
there until the Tojo managed election of 1942. Then be re-
tired from politics and devoted himself to the practice of law 
until the surrender. As a Socialist leader, he . waa neither 
dynamic, nor aggressive, nor astute, but a man of broad 
tolerance, highest integrity, and unquestioned honesty. It 
was due to these latter qualities that he won the respect from 
both the right and the left wings of his own party, and pre-
vented it from total split. 
T.he party's real strong man was Katayama's chief polit-
leal adviser, Nishio Suehiro. He served as minister without 
portfolio and chief cabinet secretary in the Katayama Cabinet, 
and later as Deputy Prime Minister in the Ashida Cabinet. 
Unlike Katayama, he l~d no academic background, no formal 
21. Katayama's writings: Law Related to Women,_ Laws Protec-
tive of Mother and Child, A Practical Guide for Retire-
ment savings, and an Outline of Civil Arbitration, all 
published in Japanese. 
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education beyond primary school, but had come up through the 
rough and tumble of union politics. Nishio frankly represented 
I the right-wing point of view. He was a compromiser, a skillful 
handler of men. His practicality just helped Katayama's 
idealism in party politics. 
Both Katayama and Nishio were not elected to the Diet 
22 in the last election (January, 1949). Katayama was defeated 
in the Yokohama district by a Communist, Inosuke Nakanisti. 
Nishio still suffered from indictment in last July on charges 
of illegal use of political funds .23 This well repres .ented 
the Socialist's complete failure and possible total collapse 
in the future. 
4. The Communist Party. The Japanese Communist Party 
was founded in 1922, but was outlawed and persecuted before 
and during the war. Following the release of political pris-
oners ordered by General MacArthur immediately after the 
occupation; the Uommunists held their fourth national party 
convention in December, 1945. Although the party was the only 
one which was not damaged but perhaps profited by SOAP's purge, 
it received very small membership in the first two Diet 
elections of 1946 and 1947. However, since the Socialists 
22. New York Times, Jan. 25, 1949. 
23. The Christian Science Monitor, July 30, 1948. 
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lost labor's support beginning late 1947, the Communists im-
mediately ran to fill the vacuum. They now virtually control 
the government communication workers, and over roughly 25 per-
cent among private unions. 24 The National Congress of Indus-
trial Organization, one of the biggest Japanese labor unions, 
is now led by CoTimunists in place of the Socialists. 25 These 
made the big Communist victory in the 1949 Diet election which 
increased the Red seats by 9 times. 
Politically and economically, the Comaunists have more 
constructive plans than other parties. It strongly opposes 
the emperor system and was the only party which voted against 
the new constitution simply because it. maintains the emperor 
even as a symbol in its provisions. It favors drastic land 
reform and people's control of Zaibatsu-owned enterprises and 
26 
the key industries. There are many characteristics in common 
between them and the left -wing Socialists. Technically the 
Communists smartly avoid attacking the occupation authorities 
and center their fire on the conservative party and regime. 
5. Peoule's Cooperative Party. The last of the "big-
fiven is the People 1 s Cooperative Party. It represents the 
small business and small land-holders. It favors cooperative 
24. The Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 29, 1949. 
25. The N~l York Times, Feb. 17, 1949. 
26. The party's 1947 platform. 
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i i d d t i 1 . i 27 i un on sm an mo era e econom c po lC es, oppos ng big-
business interests on the one hand, and socialism and c ommun-
ism on the other. 
The party was founded on May 21, 1946 by those coopera-
tives who had won seats in the Diet. Its original name was 
Cooperative Democratic Party. Later on March 8, 1947, it was 
reorganized into the present one as a result of a merger of 
the former Co-operative party and several groups of the inde-
pendent members of the Diet. Yamamoto Sanehiko was first 
elected President of the party in May, 1946, but purged about 
half a year later. Since then the party elected Miki Takeo 
as his successor. The party ran the fourth place in the Diet 
during 1946 and 1947 elections, but dropped to a fifth place 
in the 1949 election. It won votes mainly from the farmers. 
6. Party Funds. In the 1947 election the legal limit 
of campaign expenditures was 75,000 yen for each representa-
tive. No candidate officially reported exceeding that amount, 
for obvious reasons. But in political circles it was whispere 
freely that a prospective candidate with less ~han 500,000 yen 
28 ' 
at his disposal had no chance of winning. VUth the inflation 
running unchecked it is reasonable to imagine that there must 
have been more money spent in the 1949 election. Democratic 
27. The party's 1947 platform. 
28. The Christian Science Monitor, May 1, 1947. 
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politics is really an expensive business. But how did that 
money c orne to Japanese poli tica 1 parties while their country 
was torn by war and economic dislocation? 
Unlike the pre-war political parties, the parties today 
receive but te mporary and irregular funds. Prior to 1940, 
both the Seiyukai and Minseito relied upon large single-fund 
contributions from the Zaibatsu, government slush funds, and 
special funds of the military i'orces. With the Zaibatsu 
stripped of power by occupation policy , military sources dried 
up by defeat and dissolution, and secret government funds 
eliminated f rom the national budget, parties have been com-
pe lled to seek new sourc es of campaign funds. 
The funds for the Socialists and Communists chiefly 
came from the contributions of the members of the trade unions. 
They contributed the money main~y depending upon the party's 
platform and its record in the Diet. Their money as well as 
their votes were the strong factors which made the Socialists 
rise up surprisingl y in 1947, dropped down deeply in 1949; 
and the indifferent record of the Communists before, and the 
latter's heavy gain in the latest election. Mr. Lindesay 
Parrott reported from Tokyo on Jan. 11, 1949 that the Commun-
29 ists today, unlike the past, have plenty of money to spend. 
As for the two conservative parties, the Liberals and 
the Democrats, their money largely came from the following 
29. New York Times, Jan. 12, 1949. 
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four sources: (1) Contributions from the construction com-
panies which developed rapidly iamediately after the surrender 
due to the necessity of rehabilitation in a war-devastated 
country and the urgent requirements of the occupation. Such 
contributions were unquestionably connected with the elements 
of favoritism involved in the award of government construction 
contracts. 30 With the adoption of competitive bidding and the 
sa tis faction of occupation cons true tion needs , the building 
companies began to collapse in mid-1947, and so ended the con-
servatives' party-funds from this source. (2) Donation by 
dealers in scarce commodities and brokers for the sale and 
distribution of government stockpiles remaining at the close 
of the war. This was the chief funds for the conservatives 
in the 1947 election. As with the construction companies, it 
appears that the Liberal Party initially was most involved, 
because it controlled the essential administrative agencies 
during the twelve months of the Yoshida Cabinet. The Diet 
investigation and occupation prohibition were expected to dry 
up this well of party revenue. 31 (3) Illegal transaction of 
hidden war properties in which the Liberal's real boss, 
Karuko Tsuji was discovered to be particularly involved. This 
32 
case was under Diet and occupation investigation. ( 4) Party 
30. The Nip~£ Times, March 3, 1947. 
31. A special Diet Hoarded Committee was established in July, 
19 47, and was reorganized in Dec. 1947, as t1:18 Illegal 
Transactions Investf!ation Committee. Summation of Non-
lYlilitB.JIYM'f'"W:tles.. ;Japan, Jan. 1948, pp. 29-3Z""f F6'0. 
1948, pp. 42-44. 
32. The Christian Science Monitor, April 28, 1948. 
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funds involved in government control of industrial loans to 
essentially sound but hard-pressed companies. Since the Demo-
cratic Party was dominant in the flnancial policies of the 
Katayama coalition government (May, 1947--Feb., 1948), during 
this period it was the party most involved in public allega-
tions that such loans were political. This device to obtain 
party funds would not last long under Diet investigation and 
public criticism. 
7. Possibilities of Merger. With the exception of the 
Cmr:nnunists, all tbe parties discussed above are loosely or-
ganized, little disciplined, poorly indoctrinated; and their 
members can shift from one party to another easily. These 
are the basis for the possibility of a merger into two or 
three parties instead of five. 
Members of the conservative parties have long advocated 
such a merger. Shigeru Yoshida, Liberal's president and 
current Prime Minister, has consistently favored this movement 
since 1947, although he was primarily motivated by the menace 
of the continuing growth of the leftists' strength. On the 
other band, tbe left-wing Socialists and the Communists have 
also proposed a merger in a united "popular front 11 against the 
conservatives, simply opposed by the right-wing of the 
socialists. 
When the middle road parties--the Democrats and the 
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Socialists --suffered crushing defeats in the latest election, 
the poss ib ili ty of merger was greatly increased. The Democrats 
now virtually split, with their. president, Ken Inukai, leading 
one group to enroll in the Liberal Party, and former premier, 
Hitoshi Ashida, heading another and seeking to amalgamate with 
the Socialists in a left wing front excluding the Communists. 33 
The Communists, knowing that they still have only 7 percent of 
the Diet votes although their seats were increased by 9 times 
in the 1949 election, are now .endeavoring to capture the 
Socialist left-wing, the Farmer Laborites, and some Peoples 
Cooperatives in order to muster around eighty votes in the Diet 
instead of thirty-five. The Communist leader, Sanzo Nosaka, 
has appealed to all the left forces 11 to form a common front 
based upon the masses to fight the reactionary conservative 
34 
regime." It seems, there fore, that there might be only 
three parties, or perha:p9 a two-party system, on the future 
Japanese political stage. 
33. The New York Times, March 9, 1949. 
34. Ibid, Jan. 25, 1949. Sanzo Nosaka had worked in Yenan 
with the Chinese Communists during war-time. He returned 
to Japan on January 12, 1946, and was elected chairman of 
the Central Executive Committee of the Japanese Communist 
Party since the fall of 1948. 
-76-
CHAP'l1ER XI 
ELECTIONS AND CABINET CHANGES 
1. Election Reforms. The Japanese had been voting since 
1891 for their national legislators. But only men over twenty-
five years old were qualified to vote, and over thirty years 
old were qualified to be elected. Women were not qualified to 
vote. Young men over twenty and under twenty-five were also 
excluded. During the elections before the surrender, the 
"eligible" voters went to cast their ballots ei tb.er under the 
restraints of tradition, or the manipulations of politicians, 
or the management of the militarists (as Tojo's 1942 electio~ 
They knew the methods but little of the theory ?f the ballot. 
They thought they were e lee ting the men who would "advise" the 
Emperor, with little expectation of being represented. And 
they voted for the big men, or rather the big names, not for 
1 their platforms. These were the general situations -of the 
pre-surrender elections. 
"It was over-simplification", says Russell Brines, "to 
term the initial election under the occupation Japan's first 
'free' campaign. The duress of the war years was removed, 
to be sure, and the people were told they had been given a 
1. Rus s e 11 Brines , .QE • c i t. , p • 199 • 
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political voice that would be heard. 11 But the people hardly 
would be expected to understand and appreciate the theory of 
ballot within a brief period of seven months (Sept. 1945 to 
April 1946). Besides, the election was still under the old 
constitution; still ordered by the Emperor (although at the 
directive of General MacArthur); politicians still operated 
under the traditional pattern; big names, not issues, still 
were paramount. 2 Nevertheless, two steps were taken by Gen-
eral Mac,A..rthur to ulibera te 11 the election; One was to lower 
the voter's age to twenty, by which several million young men 
were added to voting lists. The other was to give the right 
to vote to thirteen million women and the right to be elected 
as well; as a result, thirty-nine of seventy-four women can-
dida tea were elected to the lower house. 
2. The 1946 Election. The first post-war election was 
held on April 10, 1946. Just what reason prompted General 
MacArthur to decide to hold an election so early was unknown. 
Probably the purge order on undesirable persons of January 4, 
1946, which made over sixty percent of the members of the old 
Diet ineligible to hold office, was one of the factors • It 
was apparent that the various Allies did not agree on this 
early election. In a note ·to SCAP on March 21, 1946, the Far 
Eastern Commission questioned whether such an early election 
2. Russell Brines, 2£• cit., p. 200. 
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could freely express the will of the Japanese people because 
the reactionary groups were still strong in organization and 
power and could easily control the ballot, and because the 
voters were still unfamiliar with the democratic process. It 
further doubted whether the result of the election could meet 
the objects of the Potsdam Declaration and prove cooperation 
with the occupation authorities. 3 To this General MacArthur 
4 
replied on March 29, 1946, saying: 
There is no ground for supposition that the 
reactionary party will secure a greater advantage 
as a result of the election at this time than at 
a later date. Political activity is now wide-
spread. Any postponement of the election would 
inevitably result in greater advantage to the more 
experienced and better organized reactionary group 
severely crippled by the purge order who would 
thereby be provided the opportunity to regroup and 
strengthen. 
Any postponement would certainly be misunderstood 
by the Japanese people, and would have a profound 
adverse reaction upon the purposes and success of the 
occupation. Should the result of the election prove 
disadvantageous to the purposes of the occupation, 
the remedy is always in my power to require the dis-
solution of the Diet and the holding of a new elec-
tion under such provisions as are deemed necessary. 
Great interest developed as the polling day, 10 April, 
1946, approached. There were 2,700 candidates (compared with 
about 1,000 in 1942 and in 1937), barely 150 of whom had been 
members of earlier Diets. It is indicative of the prevailing 
3. Occu2ation of Japan, ££• £1!., pp. 136-137. 
4. Ibid., pp. 138-140. 
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political irresponsibility that half the candidates were in-
dependents or affiliated to small mushroom parties, of which 
there were over 200 by the end of March. There was a small 
women's party, and all the big parties listed women candidates 
in an effort to attract the interest of the women voters. Reg-
istered voters numbered 37 million, of wbom, presumably as a 
result of the exceptional displacement of the male population, 
20.6 million were women and only 16.4 million were men. 5 The 
total votes were 72.1 percent of those registered. Considering 
that over half the registered was composed of women inexper-
ienced in politics and, according to many forecasts, not in-
terested,6 this was a very high poll. 7 The election was 
carried out under the close scrutiny of the Allied occupation 
forces, so that no means of coercion or intimidation or bribe 
could be applied by the local governments as they had done 
before. 
s. The discrepancy might be due to a large number of Japanese 
not yet repatriated from overseas and the excess of male 
over female casualties in war. At home evidently millions 
of demobilized servicemen were not on the electoral rolls. 
See New York Times, April 9, 1946. 
6. Only .67.1 percent of the women registered voted as compared 
with 78.5 percent of the male voters, according to Harold 
Wakefield, ££• cit., p. 134. 
7. In the spring election of 1942, the poll percentage was 83, 
but that was managed by Tojo at the height of his success. 
In 1937, the percentage was 73.3 Remember in all those 
elections there were no woman voters. 
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The outcome of the election is 
8 
as follows: 
9 
Party--- Old Diet New Di.et Women Votes in Percentage 
Elected millions 
Liberals 46 142 5 12.7 24 
Progressives 270 93 6 10.0 19 
Socialists 17 92 8 9.0 17 
Co-operators 28 16 0 1.9 4 
Communists 0 5 1 1.9 4 
Small parties 0 38 10 17.0 32 
Independents 48 78 9 
To be elected 57 2 
-466-- 466 39 52.5 100 
It is apparent that the result was predominantly censer-
vative. The Liberals ran the first and the Pro gressives the 
second. Their votes came mainly from the country -side as well 
as the small and middle cities, where their predecessors, the 
Seiyukai and the Minseito, had had traditional influence. The 
chief r eason why the Prog ressives did not retain their number-
one p osition in the new Diet was that they had received heav-
ier damag e by the pur•g e than the Liberals. The Socialists 
finished surprisingly strong, with only one seat l e ss than the 
Progressives and with the promise of increasing influence. 
8. H. Wakefield, ££• cit., p. 138 . 
9. The number o f voters was 26 . 6 million but the election was 
by a system of plural voting. The number of supporters of 
each party was about half the fi gure shown in this column. 
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This was primarily due to the current economic situation and 
not the Socialist idealogy. Their votes largely came from the 
big cities. The short time for the Communists to organize 
partly accounted for their poor showing; however, they got 
five seats, the first time in Japanese his tory. Members of the 
over one-hundred independents and small parties were largely 
associated with the two conservative parties. 
3. The 1947 Election. The second post-war election was 
scheduled in April, 1947, one year after the first. It was a 
time when the 12-month Yoshida government had lost considerable 
I 
public support for a number of reasons, particularly the fail-
ure to halt the plunging economy. Influential labor and farme 
II 
groups became outspokenly hostile and the inauguration of the 
new constitution required a fresh central and loca 1 government. 
Early in Feb. 1947, MacArthur wrote to Yoshida pointing out 
the advisability of a fresh general election in order to put 
the new constitution into function. The Japanese government 
accepted reluctantly. However, they contrived to protect 
, themselves by revising the election law which, though strongly 
opposed by the politicians on the left, was forced through the 
Diet on Warch 30, 1947. 10 On the next day, the 92nd Diet, the 
10. The original election law had provided for large electoral 
districts in which the electorate was to vote for several 
candidates. The conservatives, shortly before the electio 
proposed a change to smaller districts, with fewer repre-
sentatives, with each voter casting his ballot for only a 
single candidate. Said the Nippon Time~ editorially on 
March 23, 1947: "· •• obvious that a change at this time wil 
markedly favor the conservatives and hamper the liberals •• ' 
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last under the Meiji constitution, was dissolved. A few days 
earlier, the Progressive Party dissolved and re-emerged under 
the leadership of Hitoshi A.shida as the Japanese Democratic 
11 Party, chiefly for the new election. 
Four elections took place in April, 1947: on April 5, 
for the heads of local self-governing bodies; on April 20, for 
members of the House of Councillors; on April 25, for the House 
of Representatives; and on April 30, for local assemblymen. 
Tota 1 registered voters were over thirty million, of which 69 
' 
percent cast, · their ballots. 12 
The outcome for the House of Representatives was as 
13 follows: 
Social Democrats - -
- - - - - -143 
Liberals- - - - - - - -
Democrats 
Co-operatives- - - - - - - - - -
Communists 
Ot~rs - -
- - - -133 
- -126 
- - 31 
4 
- - 29 
466 
The result for the second chamber, the House of Coun-
cillors, was: 
11. 
12. 
13. 
New York Herald TriE'Uile, 1 April, 1947. 
Total actual voters: men;-14,659,262 (74.9% of the regis-
tered male); Women:- 13,137,620 (61.6%). See Russell 
Brines, QE• cit.,p. 203. 
New York Times, 19 . April, 1947. The parties put candid-
ates forward as follows: Democrats, 338; Liberals, 328; 
Social Democrats, 289; Communists, 121; Co-operatives, 
112; others, 416. 
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Social Democrats 
Liberals - - -
- - - 46 
- - - - - - 41 
Democrats - - - - - - - - 33 
C o:rmnunis ts - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 
Indepandents or a mall parties- - - - -126 
250 
The Socialists rose up as the biggest party in this 
election. People's dissatisfaction with the economic status 
quo in connection with the Yoshida government, and the growth 
of the organized labor strength, were the chief factors. The 
lowest abstention rate among the factory workers, and the. high-
est among conservative farmers, were accountable for the resul 
But the general trend indicated a change approximating the 
middle of the road, rather than a sharp swerve to the left. 
Because both the Socialists and the Democra. ts ·represented the 
middle course and their combined forces were the ma.-j:ori ty of 
the House of Representatives. 
The conservatives, however, remained strong. The Lib-
erals actually only lost nine seats. · Premier Yoshida, whose 
Cabinet was under a evere fire during the campaign, was yet 
elected in rural districts, together with all his ministers 
including Finance Minister Ishibashi whoa e economic policies 
had made him dis tinotly unpopular. The explanation to this 
was that not only the Japanese farmers were primarily con-
servative, but they also voted for big names, as they had done 
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in the past, without linking them to issues. 
The strength of the conservatives was particularly shown 
in the other chamber, the House of Councillors. Virtually 
all the 126 independents were associated with the rightist 
14 political force. As for the local election, the result was 
strikingly conservative. Of the 46 governorships, the conserv-
ative "independents", many of which were formerly appointed 
bureaucrats, won 31. The Socialists won 4 and the Communists 
none. The rest 11 went to Democrats and Liberals. 
Two noteworthy features were a setback for women candid-
ates and the lack of progress by the Communists. The former 
sent 10 to the new HoU9e of Councillors, while representation 
in the lower house dropped to 25. The Communist failure, 
together with the general trend toward the middle course con-
cerning the parliamentary elections, was particularly hailed 
by General MacArthur. He said the people's selections "· •• for 
the first time in Japanese history, reflected the free will of 
the majority, as against the totalitarian dictates of a minor-
ity. This is democracy." 
"The basic issue before the electorate," he added, "was 
a selection between political philosophies. That of the total-
itarian extreme right had already been discredited and rejected 
for its responsibility for war and defeat and long suppression 
of the rights and liberties of masses. On the other hand, that 
of the extreme left, and communistic philosophy, was still in 
14. H. Wakefield, ££• cit., p. 138. 
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1 issue, with its leaders strongly bidding for popular support ••• 
The Japanese people have firmly and decisively rejected its 
leadership and overwhelmingly have chosen a moderate course, 
sufficiently centered from either extreme to insure the pres-
ervation of freedom and the enhancement of individual dignity~~ 
4. The 1949 Elect!._cm. After the trial and failure of 
the two moderate coalition governments since the last election, 
one by Katayama and one by Ashida, which will be discussed 
later, it seemed quite clear both to the Japanese people and 
to the occupation authorities that Japan needed a stable and 
strong government to cope with the unstable economic situation 
and direct economic recovery. Such a stable government could 
hardly exist unless the government party controlled the lower 
house. The small margin which Mr. Yoshida won in the lower 
house in his return to power last October indicated his short-
life, as his pre de cess ora • It was then both the Japanese 
government and the occupation authorities agreed that a new 
16 
election for the lower house should be held in early 1949. 
The result of the 1949 election (on January 23, 1949) 
was a strong reverse to the previous ones. The rightist 
Democratic Liberal Party won the majority in the lower house, 
and the Communists gained by an increase of nine times. The 
middle-road parties, the Democrats and the Socialists, 
suffered so heavy a loss that they were on the verge of 
15. New York Times, April 28, 1947. 
16. The Christl~ Sci~~ Monitor, October 15, 1948. 
collapse. The former was cut about half, and the latter about 
two-thirds. Even the Socialist leader Katayama was defeated 
in the Yokohama district. This was no surprise, since the 
Japanese people had become rather disappointed with the in-
efficiency and corruption in the Katayama and Ashida moderate 
coalition goovernments after the 1947 election; and they, 
being fundamentally conservative, turned their support to the 
conservative ~rty. 
The Communist success could be understood not only by the 
labor's giving up the Soci alia ts but ala o by their better cam-
17 paign program and having more money to spend. Particularly 
the smashing victory won by the Chinese Communists in the civil 
war had a strong appeal to the Japanese people. In a broad-
cast to the Japanese people on January 15, 1949, the Chinese 
Communist leader, Mao Tse-tung, said that Communist China 
would be willing to resume trade relations with Japan only if 
the latter were governed by the Communist Party. This actu-
ally helped the Japanese Reds in their campaign. 18 
For purpose of contrast with the previous elections it 
19 
is worth-while to record the result as follows: 
17. New York Times, Jan. 12, 1949. 
18. China-Daily News, New York, Jan. 16, 1949. 
19. Christian Science Monitor, Jan. 29, 1949. 
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HOUSE VOTES IN 
PARTIES _SEATS MI LLIONS 
Democratic Liberals 263 13.6 
Democrats 70 4.8 
Social Democrats 49 4.3 
Communists 35 3.3 
People's Co-operative 14 1.1 
Independents 12 2.3 
Other Par ties 23 2.1 
466 31.6 
5. Cabinet Changes. The post-war cabinet changes also 
represented the development of democratic practice. The first 
cabinet was set up by Prince Naruhiko Higashi-Kuni, fa ther-tn-
law of the Emperor's eldest daughter, in early August, 1945, 
shortly before the acceptance of the ~otsdam Declaration. 
Needless to say that tbis cabinet, like its predecessors, came 
directly from the court and its inner circle; and it was 
actually run by a hidden combine headed by the late Prince 
Konoye, vice-premier, and his group of bureaucrats and ad-
vis ers. 
The personnel changed but tradition and power remained 
unaltered when Higashi-Kuni resigned in late 1945, as a result 
of a SCAP directive which removed his home minister. The 
dominant conservative clique, linked to the throne, selected 
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,. Shidehara, after considerable secret maneuvering, as the man 
I most likely to please the Americans and preserve their own 
viewpoint, simultaneously. Shldehara 's cabinet was a coal-
ition cabinet of the two conservative parties (the Liberals 
and the Progressives) and a few independents. 
Shidehara was under severe fire preceding and following 
the 1946 election py the lef'tist-led labor movement. On 
several occasions 11 down with Shidehara11 demonstrations took 
place before the Palace or in the courtyard of the Diet 
building . Shidehara had to resign. Hatoyama attempted to 
succeed him on the ground that he was the leader of the Liberal 
Party which turned out to be the leading party as a result of 
the election. He was barred from office by a special purge 
order on May 3, 1946. After some ten days of maneuvering, 
horse -trading, and compromise 11 settlement 11 , Shigeru Yoshida, 
Shidehara's foreign minister, took the premiership and was 
named president of the Liberal Party, to which he had not 
belonged before. It is to be noted that beginning from 
Yoshida the Japanese government was formed by the compromise 
of political parties, not recounnended by the "elders" or 
coming from the court and its inner circle, although at that 
time the Meiji constitution remained in force. This should be 
considered as one step toward democracy. 
Yoshida's cabinet, like Shidehara's, was a coalition 
cabinet of Liberals and Progressives, with the former clearly 
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dominating the coalition. The Liberals paid more attention 
~~~ to the development of their ~rty organization through dis-
tribution of the patronage and privileges of government office 
and less attention to the solution of the deteriorating 
economic situation. The continuing food crisis and an ever-
worsening inflation made the cabinet increasingly unpopular. 
Such factors during the late summer and fall of 1946 brought 
the government face to face with the rising tide of labor 
unrest, and the Socialists, being in opposition, seized the 
opportunity to lead the "down with Yoshida n rallies throughout 
the nation on December 17, 1946.20 Surprised with the growing 
strength of the Socialists through their affiliation with the 
labor movement, Yoshida sought to bring them into his govern-
ment early in 1947. His obvious des ire was, by affording 
labor representation in the cabinet, to lessen the clamor of 
the masses. This offer some right-wing Socialists were in-
clined to accept, even at the cost of left-wing defection. 
The negotiations .failed, however, mainly because of Socialist 
opposition to the retention of Yoshida's unpopular finance 
minister, Ishibashi Tanzen; and 'the Cabinet was reconstructed 
at the end of January 1947 without a ignificant change of 
political complexion. A few days later, SOAP ordered new 
elec tiona. 
20. The Nippon Times stated that some 500~ 000 people partici-
pated in the Tokyo demonstration. Another huge anti-cab-
inet demonstration was staged on Jan. 28, 1947. 
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Yoshida resigned and was succeeded by Katayama in IVIa.y, 
1947, when the latter's Democratic Social Party rose up as 
the leading party in the Diet by the election. This was a 
coalition of the Socialists, the Democrats, and the People's 
Cooperatives without the Liberals. To fabricate the coalition, 
the Socialists agreed to shelve plans for state socialism, to 
renounce all connection with the Communists, and to deny 
Socialist left-wingers any representation in the cabinet. 
During ita ten months' tenure, the cabinet fought within it-
self, mainly between the Socialists and the Democrats, over 
the former's state control program. No control was carried 
out except the "Temporary Coal-Mining Control Bill" which was 
passed by the Diet on November 25, 1947 through great diffi-
culties, and which was very mild, simply to "save face" for 
21 
the Socialists. 
Although most of the Socialist cabinet members under 
Katayama were fine gentlemen, good scholars, and idealists, 
they were, however, not real politicians, nor experienced 
administrators. They began to find a great discrepancy be-
tween theory and practice. Those difficult and complicated 
economic problems --such as the ever -present food shortage, 
aggravated inflation, and unsatisfactory wage-price relation-
ship--had not been solved by their predecessors, nor could 
they. Moreover, the intra-party strife which climaxed in 
Katayama's "disciplinary action" against his agriculture and 
21. See Nippon Times editorial of Nov. 26, 1947. 
22 
and forestry minister, Hirano Rikizo, as well as the left-
wing's clash with Katayama over the budgetary problems, greatly 
weakened the cabinet's strength and effectiveness. The budget-
tary controversy in the Diet was so violent in January,l948 
tba.t the conservatives, including the Democrats, insisted that 
Katayama "purge" the left-wingers from his party. In answer, 
the Prime Minister resigned on February 9, 1948 to preserve his 
party' a unity. 
The succession to Katayama's cabinet under the Premier-
s h ip of Hitoshi Ashida. from February to October, 1948, was also 
a coalition and middle-of-the-road government, perhaps a little 
bit more to the left. It was made up exclusively of members 
of the same three parties that formed the Katayama coalition, 
followed the lines of their respective voting 
Hirano Rikizo had been chairman of his party' a campaign 
activities in the post-war elections. He was piqued be-
cause Nishio and Katayama seemed to be siding with Wada 
Hiroo, director-general of the Economic Stabilization Board, 
rather than with himself, on certain technical economic de-
cisions. Hirano's enormous and sensitive ego was wounded 
by this and, in all probability also, by Nishio 1 s promi-
nence as the generally recognized effective power behind 
Katayama. Hirano also believed that Nishio had not taken 
a strong enough stand toward the left-wing members of the 
party. Thus Hirano, dissatisfied with his position within 
the party and a.ensing the declining fortune for the Katayama 
cabinet, undertook to plan for a new party alignment, and 
was even suspected of flirting with the Liberals. Socialist 
cabinet members, ~obably led py Nishio, charging disloyalt~ l 
oua:ted Hirano from his post as forestry and agriculture 
minister, and thereby alienated those rightist Socialists 
closely associated with Hirano in the National Farmers 
Union. After his "purge u, Hirano' a strongest Diet support-
ers left the Democratic Social Party and formed their own 
political party. "Japan 1 a Post-war Socialist Party", 
i:n the American Political Science Review, October, 1948. 
pp. 967-968. 
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1 
!strength in the Diet's lower house--eight Socialists, six Dem-
jocrats, and two Cooperatives. Although a Democrat, Dr. Ashida 
included two Socialist left-wingers --Kanju Kato and Masaru 
Nomizo--in his cabinet to which they had been denied by their 
I 
own party leader, Dr. Katayama, the previous Prime Minister, 
chiefly due to the objection of the non-Socialist coalition 
parties. Two blows, however, plagued A.shida 1 s cabinet and 
finally brought it to collapse. The first was the planned 
strike of the 3,000,000 government employees in the summer of 
/i 
/I 
/! 
I' 
,: 
•I II 
II 
il 
II 
·I 1948, ·mainly due to low payment and partly due to Communist /1 
I instigation. Although stopped by SCAP intervention, it greatly 
weakened tbe government strength. The other was the corruption 
case in the control of coal mines which involved several cab-
inet members such as Suehiro Nishio, Socialist and minister 
without portfolio; Tekeo Kuruau, chairman of the Economic 
Stabilization Board; Tokutaro Kitamura, minister of finance; 
and Kaniu Kato, minister of labor. ~lhen procurators finally 
reached for coalition premier Hitoshi Ashida, it not only 
brought an end to m .i!i.dle ~!'oad government, but a erioua ly hurt 
. the progressive wing of the conservative groupa. 23 
r 
I 
I 
It was now clear that the rightist wing of the conserva-
tives•-the Democratic Liberal Par~--had a chance to return to 
23. For details of the corruption case, see Asashi Shimbun, 
Oct. 10, 1948; Ta Kung Pao, Dec. 24, 1948; The Christian 
Science Monitor, Oct. 15, and Nov. 3, 1948.--- --
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power. After one year and a half in retirement, Shigeru 
Yoshida was renamed prime minister on October 14, 1948, to 
succeed Hitoshi Ashida. His cabinet, in contrast to the two 
predecessors, was not a coalition, but a clear-cut one party 
group. As an extreme rightist, Yoshida outspokenly opposed 
communism, was against any kind of state control on enterprises 
favored the return to private banking of operations now per-
formed by the governmental Reconstruction Finance Bank and the 
· elimination of the income tax on foreign investments as a means 
of inviting capital for Japanese rehabilitation. 24 The Japan-
ese people together with the occupation authorities, being 
dissatisfied with the previous two middle-road regimes, seemed 
endorsed Mr. Yoshida and his conservative policy. The result 
was that Mr. Yoshida's party won a majority in the lower house 
l in the 1949 election, and his single-party cabinet continued 
which proved to be much stronger than before. 
As a W1ole it seems that the post-war Japanese government 
changes, though retaining some feudalistic methods in managing 
the elections, have followed the main road of the democratic 
pattern of party politics, and acted in cqnformity with the 
provisions of the new constitution. 
24. New York Times, Oct. 17, 1948; The Christian Science 
Monitor, Oct. 15, 1948. 
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CHAPTER XII 
LABOR UNIONS 
Labor organization and collective bargaining constitute 
an important aspect of American democracy. Labor unions have 
been a strong pressure group in American politics, particu-
larly in the last sixteen years under Democratic administra-
tion. In Japan, however, the development of labor unions was 
rather slow. The rapid development in the post-war years was, 
as a matter of fact, primarily General MacArthur's, effort. 
Under his encouragement organized labor's strength in Japan 
has grown up so rapidly that now it can almost challenge the 
conservative force in the political battlefield. 
1. Labor Movement Before Occupation. Japanese labor 
movement began in the early twenties during the restlessness 
following the first world war. It was presumably due to the 
encouragement of the Russ ian revolution, the international 
labor movement, and the organization of the Japanese Communist 
Party (in 1923). The government in the beginning did not in-
terfere with, nor recognize, this mo.vement. For years the 
labor unions could not send their delegate to the International 
Labor Conference at Geneva. But in 1924, partly to create a 
good impression abroad, the government conceded that the 
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delegate should be chosen by unions having a membership of not 
less than one thousand. Bunji Suzuki, a moderate but genuine 
representative of Japanese labor, thereupon went to Geneva. 
The strengthening of organized labor, of Which this recognition 
was a symptom, was shown in improved union membership. At the 
end of 1923 membership was 125,000, while at the end of 1924, 
it was 230.000. Membership tren rose so slowly that twelve 
years later, in 1936, it claimed only 420,000 or 7 percent of 
the total workers. The year 1936 was probably the Achilles' 
heel of the labor movement, not only the organized labor mem-
bership was at its peak, but also the Social Mass Party, or-
ganized in 1932 chiefly by labor with s o:rr.e middle class support 
won 18 seats in the Diet and a year later doubled this repre-
sentation.1 In 1940 and 1942, all labor unions, toge·ther with 
all political parties, came to an end under Prince Konoye and 
General Tojo 1s militaristic regimentation. Apparently strikes 
continued to break out, however, and Japanese prisoners-of·-war 
at the communist school in Yenan reported a number of strikes 
in 1941 which were, according to this account, on a consider-
2 
. able scale. 
1. The middle class usually supported Minseito. Some of this 
class left Minseitq because the latter's association with 
Mitsubishi Zaibatsu to whom the small businessmen were 
particularly hostile. Thereupon they turned to support 
the Social Mass Party. 
I 
2. See New China Daily News, Chinese Communist org~n, Chungkin 
May 1, 1942. 
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Reasons for the slew Japanese labor movement were 
various. To summarize the opinions of Mi tsu Kohno, dis tin-
guished Japanese scholar on labor and Harold Wakefield, they 
were: 3 (1) Japanese proletariats used to the paternal re-
lationship of the employer to his workers. They were bound 
to him by deeply inbred conceptions of loyalty. {2) The 
ideas of social obligat:li.on nourished by centuries of Confucian 
thought were also one factor. (3) The stream of labor from 
the countryside into industry, the importance of women labor, 
and particularly of indentured women labor in the cotton in-
dustry, and the high annual intake of juveniles (fruit of 
Japan's population policy), together with the lockouts and 
dismissals customarily applied by capital, made labor fearful 
of the ria ka in organization and a triking. ( 4) Lack of com-
petent leadership. Labor leaders were as interested in pol-
itics as in economic advancement. Once they came to power 
such as those members of the Social Mass Party elected to the 
Diet, many of them were dominated by self-interest, and the 
voice of the little man was lost in the shuffle or never 
heard at all. (5) Unions existed on sufferance of police and 
Government, and the more firm and disciplined a strike, the 
moreunscrupulous would be the official and semi-official 
measures taken to undermine the unions lea ding it. 
3. See Mitsu Kohno, ttJapan's Proletarian Movement", Contem-
porary Japan, Tokyo, March 1937. 
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2. MacArthur's Encouragement Qg Unionism. Ever since 
the occupation General MacArthur adopted a policy to support 
labor organization and collective bargaining in order to en-
courage the working people to exert a growing democratic in-
fluence on their own behalf. It was also hoped that this 
would influence the Japanese people to volunteer for the coal 
mines when drafted Chinese and Korean miners were repatriated. 
If coal production could not meet the requirements of the 
existing industry in quantities, said the general to the Jap-
anese government, it would take ten years to rehabilitate 
their indus-tries. 4 
Follcwring this policy, the Japanese government in Dec-
ember, 1945, enacted tbe Trade Union Law, modelled upon the 
United States National Labor Relations Act of 1935, protecting 
the labor right of union and collective bargaining. The Con-
stitution of 1947 also guaranteed this as a fundamental human 
right. In February 1946, an Imper~al Ordinance on Labor 
Unions, which stated the Emperor's approval of such organiza-
tion had been issued. At the same time, the Diet enacted the 
Labor Relations Adjustment Law for purpose o.f adjusting labor 
disputes. It provides, in this connection, that the stat.e 
should serve as a mediator, not exercise coercive authority. 
Other laws regarding the prohibition of child labor and the 
full payment and necessary rest for women workers during child-
4. Occupation of Japan, ££• cit., p. 44. 
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birth were also enacted in the Diet. In April, 1946, the 
American Advisory Conmittee on Labor, formed largely by gov-
ernment officials who were technical experts in all phases of 
labor problems, came from the United States to assist the SOAP. 
Furthermore, the Japanese government, following the first gen-
eral election of 1946, set up a new Department of Labor to 
deal exclusively with labor problems. 
As a result of these policies, Japanese labor unions 
mushroomed. In four months after the occupation their claimed 
membership had surpassed the previous peak of 1936. By early 
1948 the total unions were 28,439 with 6,187,437 members, in-
eluding 1,430,037 women, already half of the non-agricultural 
working population. 5 Unions covered nearly every field of 
activity, down to the major shrines and the imperial palace. 
Among those unions two national federations were formed in 
August, 1946. The first was the National Congress of Indus-
trial Unions, organized on the vertical lines of the American 
CIO, covering 2,500,000 members; the second was the General 
Federati.on of Japanese Trade Unions, somewhat like the Amer-
ican Federation of Labor, with total membership of some 
1,500,000. The former was constantly on the aggressive, im-
patient for vio le nee and loudly up to its ears in politics, 
partly controlled by Communists; while the latter was more 
moderate, aligning itself with the Social Democratic Party but 
pledging the separation of the labor movement nfrom idealogical 
5. Russell Brines, 2£• cit., p. 168. 
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6 
and political coloration." 
Since early 1947 the Japanese labor movement seemed to 
have reached a point where General MacArthur found it necessary 
to shift somewhat his policy. In an order prohibiting the 
national strike scheduled on January 31, 1947, he informed the 
Labor leaders that "so deadly a weapon in the present impov-
erished and emaciated condition of Japan would plunge the 
great masses into a disaster not unlike that produced in the 
immediate past by the minority which led Japan into the des-
truction of war." He pointed out that the strike would hamper 
food deliveries and interfere with industry, and predicted a 
nation-wide paralysis affecting every family. He threatened 
not to s:upply further food and other daily necessities to 
Japan from the Allies if the Japanese sabotaged their own in-
dus trial production. However, he added: "while I have .taken 
this measure as one of dire emergency, I do not intend other-
wise to restrict the freedom of action heretofore given labor 
7 in the achievement of legitimate objectives". As a result 
the strike was called off in a few hours by the turn of a 
switch from Tokyo after months of preparation. Furthermore, 
the occupation authorities actually stopped the general strike 
of government workers and ordered the dissolution of their 
unions during the sumner and fall of 1948. 11There is no right 
to strike against the public safety, for anybody, anywhere, 
6 • ·;. Platforms of the GFJTU, Asahi Shimbun, March 15, 1947. 
7. · Russ ell Brines , .2..2• cit., pp. 165-166. 
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anytime 11 , SOAP declared. 8 Also former Prime Minister Hi toshi 
Ashida said in April 1948 that the government was contemplating 
enactment of a law similar to the Taft-Hartley Law to curb 
labor strikes. 9 In fact, the revision of the Labor Union Law 
and the Labor Relations Adjustment Act was under consideration 
in the present Yoshida reg1me desp1te strong protests from the 
10 labor unions and the left-wing polit1cal part1es. 
Throughout 1947 and 1948, although strikes on a national 
scale had been stopped by SCAP 1 s intervent1on, labor unrest and 
small scale strikes, primarily due to the big gap between 
wages and the rising prices, ran unchecked. From December 1945 
to February 1947, about 1,600,000 workers were involved in 
slightly over one hundred disputes, half of which resulted 1n 
strikes. The average family was spending 1,500 yen monthly 
for livel1hood, while the h1ghest monthly wage, in m1ning, was 
only 945 yen. During December 1947, economics again became 
pressing; a total of 1,132,352 workers were involved in 168 
disputes, Which included 63 strikes, 15 lockouts and 21 in-
stances of production control. As a result highly unionized 
industries granted monthly average wages of between 2,500 yen 
8. Quoted by Yasaka Takaji, "Defeat and Democracy in Japan", 
~ign Affairs, Vol 26, No. 4, July 1948, p. 646. 
9. Summation of Non-military Activities in Japan, April, 1948, 
p. 102. 
10. New York Times, Feb. 17, 1949. 
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and 3,500 yen. The government, however, estimated average 
living costs at over 4,000 yen monthly. In January 1948 alone 
1,900,000 workers were involved in 162 disputes of which about 
18% resulted in work stoppag es. Average monthly wages for 
laborers ranged from 1,130 yen in textile spinning to 5,213 
t yen for pit workers in coal mines, while the government re-
ported average household expenditures in twenty-eight cities 
11 
were 6,498 yen per family, of Which over 60% was for food. 
It would be hard to alienate the labor movement from 
politics, in Japan as well as in other nations. For three 
years the Japanese labor movement has been closely associated 
with party politics, particularly with the leftists --the left-
wing Socialists and the Communists, of which we have partly 
dis cussed in the previous two chapters. Unions' support in 
money and campaign contributed to the Socialists' victory in 
1947 and the the Communists' surprising increase in Diet seats 
in 1949. Most of the union leaders were at the same time Diet 
members. Of this problem the SCAP and the Far Eastern Com-
mission held different views: SCAP spokesmen insisted that 
labor's direct participation in politics was excessive use of 
union power, while the FEC issued a policy directive in Dec-
ember, 1946, which said bluntly that labor should be "encour-
aged to participate in politics. No qualification was placed 
on the extent of participation. It helped, unquestionably, 
11. All these statistics were taken from The Japanese Labor 
Monthly, (Tokyo} March, 1947 , ; Jan., 1948; Feb., 1948. 
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to transform the prospective general strike into the political 
battle that it ultimately became. The directive also became 
the charter for those unions anxious to win political poV/er. 
3. Communist Control. Labor's interest in politics and 
the Communists' interest in the labor movement constituted a 
1 natural combination of Communist and labor unions. The first 
Communist led labor movement was the 1946 May Day parade in 
Tokyo, in Which possibly half a million demonstrators took par~ 
an impressive eXhibition of labor's strength. A manifesto 
issued on this occasion accused bureaucrats, capitalists, 
landowners, and other 'feudalistic elements' of evading the 
directives of SCAP, especially those relating to food hoarding, 
election mal-practices, surrender of arms, and collective bar-
gaining. This manifesto caused an Allied dispute that could 
not be concealed. In discussing it Mr. George Acheson, chair-
man of the Allied Council, alleged that it bore signs of hav-
ing been translated from a foreign language into Japanese. 
He objected to the Soviet member's acceptance of the allega-
tions in tbe manifesto as facts, and pointed out that the 
document had no signatures. He added: "I do not need to tell 
you that the United States does not favor communism in the 
United States or' Japan ••• The Communist Party is not suppressed 
in the United States and it has been allowed in Japan to have 
the same rights as other par ties." Members of the Council, 
said Mr. Acheson, should not 11 g'ive support in public meetings 
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of the Council or otherwise to any one Japanese political 
party". The Japanese Communist Party responded to this rebuke 
to the Soviet member of the Council with the assertion that 
the May Day manifesto had be~n drafted in the Japanese lan-
guage by a committee representing nine labor organizations with 
two million members. 
The Communist control of labor unions is quite apparent, 
particularly after the f allure of Katayama 1 s Socialist coali-
tion government in February 1948. Today the National Congress 
of Industrial Unions, the biggest federation which claim2 
2,500,000 members in major transportation utilities and allied 
unions, is at least partly controlled by the Cormnunists. Its 
first president, Kikunami, openly joined the Communist Party 
after losing his union position when his strike failed due to 
SCAP intervention in early 1947. SCAP officials said many 
of the congress' affiliates were under Communist domination. 
Among the forty-three members of the Congress' central 
executive committee, thirteen were party members, according to 
SCAP investigation in 1948. John W. Gibson, assistant Secre-
tary of Labor, found in his recent trip in Japan, Communist 
domination substantial among the communication workers, also 
in railroads and mining. The unions of government employees, 
recently dissolved following their abortive national strike 
last August by the consistent pressure of the occupation 
authorities, were ala o Communist dominated. 
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The Communist domination of Japanese trade unions caused 
great attention from Washington. Besides sending assistant 
Secretary Gibson to Ja}.:an to ~ tudy this problem, Secretary of 
Labor Maurice J. Tobin had suggested · to the Army 11 tha1:; we 
send a committee of top union leaders to Japan to confer with 
the lab or leaders there and to give them some idea of how 
12 
democratic trade unions work in the United Statestt. 
Considering the fact that Japan today is still predom-
inantly conservative, we think the rising force of labor 
unions could serve as a balance of power in politics and be 
unquestionably helpful to Japanese democracy. But how to 
direct this force into moderate or middle-of-the-road attitudes 
without letting it fall a vic tim to the extreme left or 
surrender to the extreme right is a very delicate and com-
plicated problem for the occupation authorities. It is crystal 
clear ~at either extremists' domination of Japan would be 
an end to democracy. 
12. New York Times, Feb. 17, 1949. 
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CHAPT ER XI II 
EMANCIPATION OF WOMEN 
1. Women Under Totalitarian ReEime. Under the total-
itarian regime before the surrender, the Japanese women not 
only had no political position, but also no social position. 
They had no right to vote and could not hold public office, 
as we have already discussed in ·the previous chapters. "Women 
in the ranks of the aristocracy were bound by the traditions, 
customs, and rules of etiquette which had regulated the way of 
life of the Japanese from time immemorial. The lower class 
continued to subscribe to the belief that this is a man-made 
world and that woman's place in it is to minister to man's 
needs, subscribe with blind faith to his ideas, obey his com-
1 
mands, and bear his children." No such thing as ''independence" 
or "individuality" ever existed in the personality of Japanese 
women. 
Except for some of the upper middle class who were given 
some say in the choice of husbands, marriage for the Japanese 
girls was purely a family arrangement. Even among the former 
they could not choose their husbands as freely as in the 
Western countries. Usually their father would select a hus-
band for them, and if they did not agree, another choice would 
i~ H :,; :wakefield, .2£• cit., P• 73. 
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be made. Generally the girl had no opportunity of meeting 
young men of her own age and, consequently, was rarely in a 
position to weigh in her own mind the possible merits and 
demerits of a p1~spective husband. In the system of divorce 
virtually "the husband could divorce his wife at will, while 
the wife possessed no corresponding rights when she wished to 
dispose of her husband. The legal term 1 by mutual consent' 
employed to denote the termination of a marriage, was often 
an entirely meaningless one and p~rticularly a cruel one as 
well, when the husband was almost invariably given the custody 
of any children should he desire it. Only in exceptional cir-
c~~tances, when the husband was a criminal, for example, 
2 
wc:u ld the judge give the wife the custody of her childrentt. 
It was a common story tba.t the Japanese women were sold for 
prostitutes or quasi-slave labor, working in factory for long 
hours with little or no pay, by their father or husband. No 
law enacted to protect them. 
2. Women's Emancipati2a ~SOAP. Since the occupation 
the situation was drastically changed. The Japanese women 
' 
were given an equal footing and rights as men. They could vote 
and be elected, and in fact many have been law-makers in the 
Diet since the 1946 election, as we have noted before. A new 
Japanese Women Party was set up in December 1945, the first 
time in Japanese history, and was reorganized in February, 
2. Ibid., P• 74. 
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1946 into the New Japan Women' a League. It proposed to es-
tablish permanent peace, eliminate social evils, and widen 
the a cope of activities of Japanese women. All the big 
parties, besides listing women candidates, drafted special 
platforms for the emancipation and equality of women. In the 
Katayama Cabinet, Mrs. Chiyo Sakakibara was Vice-Minister of 
Justice; also on October 23, Miss Tsuruyo Kondo was named Vice-
Minister of Foreign Affairs by Premier Yoshida. Thus the 
Japanese women, for thousands of years underdogs in the Jap-
anese Society, have now attained high government positions. 
For the sake of protecting women 'a new position, the 
constitution of 1947 specifically provides two artie lea: 
Chapter I I I Art. 14 reads: "All of the people are equal under 
the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, 
economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, soc-
ial status, or family origin." Art. 24 reads: "Marriage shall 
be based only on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall 
be maintained through mutual cooperation with the equal rights 
of husband and wife as a bas is. With regard to choice of 
spouse, property rights, inheritance, choice of domicle, 
divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the fam-
ily, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual 
dignity and the essential equality of the sexes." 
-108-
CHAPTER XIV 
LAND REFORM 
1. The Importance of Land Reform to Democracy. Land 
reform in Japan has two meanings. The first is to better the 
lives of two thirds of the agrarian workers. The second is 
to weaken the prestige and influence of the land-owning class. 
Both are important to Japanese democracy because large 
groups of peasants should be fed before they can appreciate the 
conception of democracy, and because the land-owning class of 
Japan has traditionally dominated the local politics, and 
associated themselves with the reactionaries --the ultra-
nationalists, the militarists, and the Zaibatsu. 
2. Agrarian Situation Before Reform. The agrarian 
Japanese numbered 35,000,000, and the cultivated land 
15,000,000 acres. If equally distributed their average living 
standard is still below the reasonable level. To add to this 
tragedy, over 70% of the farm families were tenants and part-
1 
tenants, of which 50% rented less than 1.2 acres each. This 
in itself would explain the pover~y of the Japanese tenants. 
But the situation was made worse by the conditions of tenancy. 
1. Japanese Year Book, 1939, (Tokyo), p. 196. 
========~================~==--=~================~~=================*========~ 
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Land hunger and the intensity of competition for land owner-
sh ip and cultivation ri ghts had pres erved land values and 
rental rates far above a level justif ied by the productivity 
of the soil. Landlords took full advantage of these conditions 
Rentals of 507& of the rice crop and only slightly less of other 
crops were customary. In a ddit i on, the tenants met a number 
of other assessments and dues, bought their own expensive 
fertiliz er, and provided the farmhouse, implements, and seed. 
The actual share they drew for their sustenance frequently 
represented not more than thirty percent of the crop. Added 
to this was t h e fact that often a landlord might terminate the 
lease at will. In cases of bad weather and poor fertilizer 
which resulted in a poor harvest, it was no wonder that some 
of the peasants had to sell a daughter or wife to meet the 
rentals and government ta x . 
Japanese ls. ndlords diff ered from a imilar groups in the 
west. Their estates were much smaller and their number was 
much larger. There were, of course, great landlords in Japan. 
rf.bree percent of the farm owners possessed 30% of the cultiva-
ted land and nearly ' one-half of the tenanted land. Among them 
one .finds 3 1 000 landlords who own 122 acres or more, and only 
2 25 who averaged 4,500 acres each. But there were several 
hundred thousand small landlords. The scale of operations of 
2. The Far East Year Boo k , 1941, p. 287. 
--------
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an average Japanese farmer was so small and the demand for 
land was so great that one did not need to own a thousand 
or a hundred, or even ten acres to become a rent collector. 
An acre might serve the purpose. Landlordism on a moleculor 
scale was, therefore, to be found in every section of the 
country; even Hokkaido, where the holdings were much larger 
than in the rest of Japan, was no exception. 
Those landlords, little and small, wielded enormous 
prestige and influence in every village. They had been welded 
together in support of the status-quo by the long and stormy 
history of agrarian unrest. They dominated local politics, 
and their position in the village formed the basis of their 
power in the nation. It was from this class that the Japanese 
army and navy drew heavily for their officers, and it was upon 
those landlords that the reactionary parties of Japan always 
relied for support. 
3. The Land Reform Sponsored ~SOAP. It was, therefore, 
as much from a recognition of the close relationship between 
the anti-democratic tradition of Japan and the rural landlord 
system, as from an interest in the tenant farmers' welfare, 
that a redia tribution of land ownership became occupation 
policy. The principal aim of this policy was to create in-
dependent land cultivators who were exp~cted to prop the new 
-111-
Japanese democracy . In his land-reform directive of December 
15, 1945, General MacArthur orde r ed the Japanese government 
11 to take measures to insure that those who till the soil of 
Japan shall have a more equal opportunity to enjoy the fruits 
of their labor", not as an end in itself, but in order to 
"remove economic obstacles to the revival and strengthening of 
democratic tendencies, establish respect for the dignity of 
man, and destroy the economic bonda ge which has enslaved the 
3 Japanese farmer to centuries of feudal oppress ion." In com-
pliance with this directive, the Japanese government enacted 
on March 15, 1946 two land reform laws, the Special Measure 
for the Establishment of Owner-Farmers (Land Reform Law), and 
the Agricultural Land Adjustment Law, which are the legal 
basis for the land reform now under way. 
These laws provide for the purchase by the Japanese gov-
ernment of approximately 5,000,000 acres, or about 80% of the 
farm lands under tenant' cultivation, for subsequent resale 
to the tenants. The change in title is to be effected in two 
years. Absentee owners and Ugentlemen farmers" would have to 
sell out all their land. Each family of the resident land-
lords may retain 2.5 acres of the tenant-cultivated land; in 
Hokkaido, because of the larger farm pattern, they are per-
mitted ten acres. Owner-cultivators are restricted to 7.5 
3. SCAP: Two Years of Occupation, Tokyo, Public Information 
Office, GHQ, 1947, p. 185. 
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acres in Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, and to 30 acres in 
Hokkaido. 
The land transfer is to be administered by the loc·al, 
prefectural and national land commissions. The local commis-
sions are the pivotal agencies of the reform. They will des-
ignate the actual plots in each village which wi 11 be made 
available by the government for tenant ownership. A local 
commission normally consists of five tenants, three non-culti-
. I vating land-owners, and two owner-farmers, all of whom are 
elected in each village by the categories of farmers or land-
owners whom they represent. 
The price of buying and sellfng of land by government 
is officially fixed. The government will purchase the land 
at an average price of 3,000 yen per acre for rice land and 
1, 860 yen per acre of dry and upland fields. In addition, 
the owners will receive a government subsidy of 880 yen per 
acre for rice fields and 520 yen per acre for uplands. This 
subsidy, however, will not be paid on more than 7.5 acres per 
individual seller in Honshu, Kyushu and Shikoku, and 30:, 'acres 
in Hokkaido. 4 The government will pay the landlords in 24-yr. 
annuity bonds, bearing interest at the rate of 3. 65% per year. 
Tenants cultivating the land acquired by the government 
4. These are the prices included by th e Japanese in their in-
itial land-reform proposals submitt~d to SCAP in response 
to General MacArthur's directive. The exchange rate, 
fixed by SCAP, is 50 yen for $1.00. 
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Actually the tenants have been benefited by the inflation and 
the ever increasing food prices, and many of them will be able 
to pay all or a substantial portion of the field-purchase 
price outright. It would be much easier for annual payments 
because the inflation actually diminutes the fixed land-prices. 
The Land Reform Law prohibits sales by the tenants of land 
acquired tinder the program except through the agency of the 
Japanese government and on term stipulated by the government. 
Under this program, 80% of the tenants could be trans-
formed into independent cultivators. But there would be still 
one-fifth whose lo:t·:_ must be better off. The measure provides 
a reform for the tenancy, i.e., elimination of rent payments 
in kind at a fixed proportion of the crop. Rents are now to . 
be paid in cash at a stated amount, which may not exceed 2556 
of the value of the rice crop and 1~;~ of the value of other 
crops. In addition, the measure also outlaws the custom of 
renting by ·a. verbal agreement, which landlords might terminate 
on short notice. The agreement now must be a written contract 
specifying the rent, the period of tenure and other terms of 
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the agreement, to be regia tered i n the villag e and to conform 
to a mode 1 contract pre scribed by the Minis try of Agriculture 
and Forestry. 
By the end of 1948, about 4,500,000 acres of land have 
been purchased by the Japanese government, and nearly all of 
it how has been resold to former landless tenants. The bank 
records at the end of 1947 showed that the farmer for the first 
time in his tory had a substan tial cash reserve. 5 And the Jap-
anes e farmer, historically the underdog in Japanese political 
a nd economic society, is showing distinct signs of a new aware-
ness of political, economic and social standing. 
5. The cash reserve, however, dropped by 50.% by the end of 
1948~ mainly due to the heavy food collections and govern-
ment high tax ordered by SCAP in ace ordance with ~Iashing­
ton's new economic policy toward Japan. See Christian 
Science Monitor, Jan. 19, 1949. 
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PART FOUR 
THE BASIC REFORM 
CHAPrEE XV 
RE-EDUCATION 
1. Former Japanese Education. The main purpose of 
former Japanese education, since the Meiji Restoration, was to 
replace the elements of Confucianism in the aristocratic edu-
cational system of feudal Japan by the native Shinto faith. 
It was 11 to instil into the minds of the people, and above all 
of the rising generation, belief in and loyalty to the divine 
1 Emperor and devotion to a divine national mission". Following 
this purpose, Japanese education became a most efficient and 
fundamental tool of the totalitarian regime and bore, not un-
naturally, the following undemocratic characteristics. 
A. CENTRALIZED EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 
All the Japanese educational institutions were controlled 
by the Ministry of Education of the central gover.n~ent. Col-
leges and universities were under the direct control of that 
ministry, secondary and elementary schools were under the con-
trol o~ the educational sections of the prefectural and local 
goverlli~ents which were also strictly supervised by that Minis-
try. School administrative systems, curricula, textbooks, and 
1. H. Wakefield, .2.12.• cit., p. 63. 
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teachers, must be approved and frequently inspected. Such a 
system was to fix a certain quantum of knowledge to be ab-
sorbed at each level of instruction and tended to disregard 
differences in ability and interest of pupils. Through pre-
scription, textbooks, examinations and inspection, the system 
lessened the opportunities of teachers to exercise professional 
freedom. The staff in charge of the control of education, 
however erudite and s~holarly, were largely without profes-
sional preparation or experience in education and( classroom. 
Under this system, it was easy for the central government to 
pre-determine what kind of citizen they wanted. In other 
words, there was no free education but standardization and 
uniformity in the training of citizenship. 
B. INJECTION OF ULTRA-NATIONALISM 
Since the propagation of State Shinto faith was the main 
purpose of education, as already noted, it was natural that 
ultra-nationalism dominated Japanese schools and society. 
Every school principal must read the Imperial Rescript on 
Education of October, 1890, which was the guiding principle 
of Japanese education, to a gathered staff and students an· 
the annual October 30, with every ceremonial reverence. The 
Emperor's photo was posted on the wall of every school. 
Students were ins true ted that to save this photo was more im-
portant than to save their own lives, in case of natural 
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calamities. 2 Teachers and students made occasional visits to 
the Meiji Shrine in Tokyo and that of the Sun Goddess at Ise, 
or to local shrines. Every student was familiar with the 
"sacred and inviolable" dignity of the Emperor, the supremacy 
of the Japanese race, and the divine mission of the Japanese 
people; and learned to live, to work, and to die for them. 
C. INJECTION OF MILITAR1SM. 
Beginning with the middle school, in normal times, 
students had to receive military training. Military instruc-
tors were provided by the Minis try of War. Aside from the 
classworks and field drills which occupied no less than five 
hours a week, there were field exercises once a year extending 
over ten days in the real operation of the machine guns, bay-
onets, and hand grenades, usually in conjunction with the 
Army units. The daily life of the students was as severe as 
that of a real soldier. 
D. THOUGHT CONTROL 
The thought control in China was not invented by Dr. 
Chen Li-fu, former Chinese Minister of Education. It was im-
migrated from the totalitarian countries, particularly from 
Japan. Japan had exercised the thought control over her youth 
for a number of years. The campaign against "dangerous thought 
since 1930 did not restrict to communist ideas, but extended 
2. Ibid., pp. 63-64. 
-118-
to all intellectual deviations from the officially prescribed 
path. 59,000 persons were put into prison for various thought 
offences in the year of 193.6. Thought control organizations 
operated in colleges and universities under the cloaks of 
such beautiful titles as the Committee for the Promotion of 
Japanese Learning, Committee for the Promotion of Student's 
Welfare, New Council on Innovation in Education and Learning, 
and so on. Libraries and bookstores were purged of the 
volumes containing "unhealthy" ideas which prejudiced the 
"divine mission" of the Japanese people. 
It is easy to imagine, therefore, if all these systems 
remain unchanged, if all those Japanese teachers still hold 
their jobs without being retrained, what a handicap there is 
to democracy 1 
2. Steps Toward Re-education. The Potsdam conferees 
recognized the primary importance of education as a means of 
establishing and strengthening democratic tendencies among 
the Japanese people. Only a democra•tic ally educated Japanese I 
people would be able to stimulate and defend political progress 
and build a frame of mind conducive to peaceful cooperation 
with other nations. 
A. ALLIED SPEC Ilt' IC EDUCA.TI ONAL PROGRAM 
FOR JAPAN 
On the bas is of this recognition the Allied powers on 
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September 14, 1945 set up speclfic policy for an e ducational 
program. This policy, based on the broad outlines of the 
Potsdam Proclamation, established that the goal of the educa-
tional program would be the re-education of the whole Japanese 
population. This re-education would be ach ieved through the 
influence and assistance of reliable Japanese leaders in 
every field and through the employment of all appropriate 
means --books (including textbooks), periodic,e.ls, motion pic-
3 tures, radios, lectures, discussion groups, and the schools. 
B. PURGE ON TEACHERS 
The Allied powers issued the necessary directives to 
SCAP. The directives ordered removal from their positions of 
teachers who were active exponents of militarism and aggres-
sion or who might otherwise attempt to thwart the purposes of 
military occupation. Teachers would be disqualified if they 
bad been members of any terr•or is t secret society such as the 
Black Dragon Society; if they had held a responsible position 
in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, which the mil-
itarists used to keep the people in line; if they had held a 
responsible position in the militaristic government; if they 
had held off icer 1 s rank in the Army and Navy; if they had 
written articles and books in defence of aggression and 
against democracy. The unsuitable teachers would be replaced 
3. Occupation of Japan, ££• cit., P• 33. 
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with qualified successors. As a result about 24% of the total 
number of Japanese teachers resigned, another 5,000 out of the 
4 
remaining 530,000 teachers were dismissed. 
C. REORGANIZATION DN INFORMATION BOARD AND 
EDUCATION . DEPARTMENT -
By October, 1945, the Japanese Board of Information had 
been stripped of its powers of censorship and otter wartime 
authority. After democratic reorganization it would inves-
tigate national policies and public opinion and provide ser-
vices to the press and radio, motion pictures, theatrical, and 
other cultural enterprises. By December a wide variety of 
media of information had begun to ins true t the Japanese people 
in the democratic meaning of the vote and the responsibility 
of the people to use the ballot. Special programs were aimed 
at the women. 
The Ministry of Education was also reorganized in Octo-
ber, 1945. Educators whose recor ds showed them to be 11 lib-
erals" were put into ke~neducational jobs. Machinery was set 
up to investigate completely and certify all school teachers. 
By January, 1946, and for the first time in the Japanese 
his tory, professional educators bad been appointed Minister and 
Vice-Minister of Education. At this time the Ministry appointro 
a committee of Japanese educators to work with a mission of 27 
prominent American educators who were being sent to Japan to 
4. Russell Brines, ££• cit., pp. 237-238. 
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study and develop a re-education program for the Japanese. 
D. ABOLISH MILITARY TRAINING IN SCHOOLS 
Coincident with the reorganization of the Board of In-
formation and the Minis try of Education, SCAP ordered the dis-
bandment of the nationalistic Students' Corps, stopping of 
school military training and all courses dealing with military 
matters, war and war industries, and aggressive nationalism. 
The school military training was substituted by physical edu-
cation and recreation. In addition, SCAP ordered an end of 
the discrimination in favor of applications from former mili-
tary school students for admission to educational iri..9titutions. 
State Shintoism was eradicated from the schools. 
E. TEXTBOOK INVESTIGATION 
Textbooks also occupied SCAP's interest. After a pre-
liminary investigation of thousands of texts in use in the 
Japanese schools, publication was stopped in November, 1945, 
while all Japanese texts were examined for anti-democratic 
content. In December, SCAP banned all textbooks on morals, 
geography, and Japanese history, because these were highly 
colored with imperialistic and anti-democratic contents. 
Teaching of these subjects was hal ted until sui table texts 
could be issued. In January, 1946, 143 texts had been certi-
fied as suitable for use in the schools, and temporary texts 
had been approved for use in place of the banned texts. In 
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February, another 300 textbooks were approved. 
F. U.S. EDUCATION MISSION TO JAPAN 
--- -- ~~~ 
The United States Education Mission came to Japan in the 
Spring of 1946. After approximately one month on the spot in-
vestigation, it made a report in which, besides endorsing the 
measures taken by SCAP' s C i vi 1 Information and Education sec-
5 tion, it :rmde two important recommenda tiona: ( 1) Decentraliz-
ing the Japanese educational system 11 in order that teachers 
may be freed to develop professionally under guidance, without 
regimentation. They, in turn, may then do their part in the 
development of free Japanese citizens." ( 2) Substituting some 
type of the Roman alphabet for the involved ideographs used by 
the Japanese to make them easy to read and write. These recom-
mendations however, have not been adopted thus far. 
G. U.S. LIBRARY MISSION TO JAPAN 
Under the encouragement of SCAP, the Japanese Diet, 
since the election of 1946, planned to establish a National 
Diet Library, modelled, presumably, on the United States Con-
gress Library in Washington. In a letter to General MacArthur 
on July 12, 1947, the Diet asked SCAP to lend them assistance 
by inviting some American experts to advise them. Pursuant 
to this request, the U~ited States Library Mission was formed 
and ari"ived in Tokyo on December 14, 1947. After several 
5. For details, see Report of the United States Education 
Mission to Japan, State Department publication 2579, Far 
Eastern Series 11, u. s. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.c., 1946. 
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months of study the miss ion made a detailed report to SCAP 
regarding the organization, the charter, and the budget of 
6 the coming National Diet. Library of Japan. 
6. For details see Report of the u.s. Library Mission to 
Japan, State Departmen t publication 3200, Far Eastern 
Series 27, Governm.ent Printing Office, Washington, D. c., 
October 1948. 
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PART FIVE 
EVALUATION AND CONCLUSI ON 
CHAPTER XVI. 
EVALUATION . AND CONCLUSION 
1. Evaluation. It seems difficult to evaluate the re-
form laws and decrees dis cussed in the pre ceding 13 chapters 
(Chapters III--XV). As far as quality is concerned, they are 
unquestionably good, important, necessary, and desirable. 
However, you cannot reform and democratize Japan on paper. 
Good laws and good decrees do not nec essarily mean good prac-
tices and good progress. It involves many questions the an-
swers to which could serve as criteria for the evaluation. 
First we might ask whether the reform laws are enough from the 
quantitative point of view; and if so, are there any contra-
dictions ? Secondly, do the Japanese people really know what 
they mean in view of the fact that they never experienced such 
things before? If the Japanese do not know, they must depend 
upon interpretations of those laws and decrees; and the 
question becomes, how are th~ interpreted? Third, are the 
techniques used for carrying out the reforms sound or not? 
If not, this would naturally influence the real progress and 
the final result. Fourth, how about the real progress? r,hese 
questions must be .answered in order to measure the validity 
and durability o.f the reforms dealt with in this thesis. 
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I 
A. . ARE THE LAWS AND DECREES SUFF ICIENT FOR 
DEMOC RATIC REFORM 
The ans wer to this question is negative. It is really: a 
stupendous and complicated job to change a country politically, 
economically, and socially. No program could be complete, 
particularly in the short period of three years, when spon-
sored by foreigners, and backed by bayonet. It seems that 
General MacArthur and his aides lacked a basic study of Japan 
or an over-all preparation before they launched the programs. 
He missed some major points, and particularly_, had not a com-
bined and coordinated program of democratization an d economic 
rehabilitation. In the winter number of the Columbia Journal 
of International Affairs, Professor Richard L. Sneider points 
out that "democracy in Japan is dependent not only on changing 
the locus of poll tica 1 and economic power, but also on attain-
ing long-run economic stability." How to have these two 
things-- democracy and_ economic stability--achieved without 
contradiction is important. 
As for the :rmjor points he missed, there are several 
examples. In his elimination of State Shintoism, the only 
thing General MacArthur did is to compel the Emperor to 
abandon his deity; he did nothing to the way-side Shinto 
shrines, particularly the Shrine of Ise and the Shrine of Meij~ 
which were definitely the bas is of the theory of the Emperor's 
deity and racial superiority--the core of State Shintoism. 
, Moreover, he did not touch a jot on Confucianism and 
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Buddhism, apparently assuming that they did not contribute to 
Japanese poli tica 1 dictatorship and no harm to Japanese dem-
ocracy. Unfortunately, these two religions, according to Dr. 
Reischauer, contributed equally and cooperatively to Japanese 
political thought with State Shintdism. In his book Japan-
Government, Politics, Dr. Reischauer analyzes Japanese polit-
ical thought into (1) society is more important than the in-
dividual, (2) all men are by nature unequal, (3) government by 
men is superior to government by law (4) the patriarchal family 
1 is the family state. The first theory is supported, says the 
author, not only by State Shintoism which made the Emperor the 
descendant and representative of the great deity of Heaven 
(Amatsuhami) and the head of the Japanese big family, but also 
2 
by the five human relationships of Confucianism in which the 
individual is primarily a member of the family, which is an in-
tegral part of a clan, which in turn must subordinate itself to 
the largest of all families, the whQle Japanese nation. It is 
supported, moreover, by the Buddhist identification of the 
Supreme Bu~with the Japanese Great sun Goddess, ancestress 
of the Imperial Family. As for the inequality among men, 
Shintoism maintains that it is based upon blood, Confucius 
says it is due to the fundamental superior and inferior 
virtue of human beings, Buddhism accepts it in its 
1. Robert K. Reischauer, Japan-Government, Politics, Thomas 
Nelson and Sons, 1939, pp. 21-34. 
2. Ibid., p. 27. The five human relationships of Confucianism 
are: relationships of ruler and subjects, husband and wife, 
parents and child, elder child and younger child, friend 
and friend. 
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doctrine of "karma" and reincarnation which asserts that one's 
life is the reward or punishment for one 's past deeds in 
former incarna.ti ons. Aceording to Buddhism, the rich and poor, 
the noble and the inferior, are due to the fact that they have 
done good or bad things in their former existence. These 
teachiil@:l actually have taught the Japanese to be as aristo-
cratic and class conscious a people as can be found in the 
annals of history. It is believed that, for the sake of 
changing Japanese authoritarian political thought, something 
must be done to the teachings of Confucianism and Buddhism. 
The early promulgation of the 1947 constitution with 
its guarantee of freedom of religion naturally handicapped 
General MacArthur in doing anything whatsoever negatively to 
the activities of religion. However, positively, he could 
correct Japanese political thought throug~ his program of re-
education. Unfortunately the progress of re-education is the 
slowest of all reforms. 
At least one thing General MacArthur could do, but so 
far it is not in his program. That is the encouragement of 
Christianity in Japan. Japan needs a religion to create her 
people's individual personality. Individualism, not collect-
ivism, is wbat the Japanese particularly lack, and it is very 
important to democracy. No religion but Christianity could do 
the job. Japanese Christiana number only 400,000 in an island 
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of 80,000,000. How pitifully small it isl 
No one can deny the fact, that Christianity, particularly 
Puritanism, has contributed to the British and American dem-
ocracies. It has been an essential element of Western civil-
ization. Western civilization is an entity in which one thing 
is closely interrelated with another. If Japan is to be dem-
ocratized along the line of Western democracy, it is better 
to transplant Western civilization to Japan in whole and not 
in part. The fact that the Meiji Restoration adopted Western 
industrialism, constitutionalism in distorted form, and 
wholly discarded Western Christianity, which resulted in the 
present tragedy, is a. clear proof. Moreover the abolition of 
State Shintoism has created a vacuum which would be better 
filled with Puritan Christianity. 
The discordance between democratic reform and economic 
rehabilitation and stabilit.y is clearly shown by General Mac-
Arthur's treatment of Japanese labor unions. The general en-
couraged labor unionism since the occupation, and guaranteed 
the labors' right of organization and collective bargaining 
in the 1947 constitution, but he repeatedly interfered with the 
national strikes and even ordered the dissolution of the unions 
· of government employees, saying that the large scale str1:kes 
would impede economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. 
Although this is quite true, nevertheless, his interference 
with the right to strike also tends to cancel the democratic 
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reform. 
B. TH E INTERPRETATION OF' REFORM LAWS 
It is apparent that a different or a. dis tor'ted inter-
pretation of the laws and decrees of democratic reform would 
affect tremendously their spirit. The matter of interpretation 
is very important particularly in view of the fact that few 
Japanese people are familiar with the Western conception and 
practice of democracy, and that most of the laws and decrees 
were drafted under the directives of SCAP or directly done by 
the latter. It is conc.eivable that the Japanese understanding 
of these new laws and decrees may largely depend upon inter-
pretation. Unfortunately some influential elements of the 
Japanese wh o are in a position to interpret those new laws and 
decrees seek to dilute them by misinterpretation, deliberately 
or otherwise. Their attitude is due to various reasons, such 
as, that they accepted these new laws only under duress; or 
that they feared that too rapid democratization will produce 
disorder an:i civil strife; or that they cherished the priv-
ileges and power of oligarchy and bureaucracy. As a whole, 
their attitude is too deeply attached to tradition to welcome 
democratic reform. 
Such is the position of Dr. Kanamori toward the new con-
stitution. During tbe d·B-bate on August 29, 1946 in the Diet, 
Dr. Kanamori Tokujiro, the minister of state who bore the 
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brunt of the burden of explaining the provisions of the con-
stitution to the Diet, was pressed by an eminent professor of 
constitutional law, Dr. Sasaki Soichi, as to whether or not 
the ne~ constitution provided for a change in the national pol-
ity. Kanamori replied in the negative. He maintained that the 
constitution does not alter the 11 characteristics of the state." 
Dr. Sasaki responded that the principal characteristic of the 
Japanese state had been the sovereignty; of the Emperor by vir-
tue of his lineage. He maintained that with the disappearance 
of this distinctive characteristic t~e polity . had been funda-
mentally altered. Kanamori, however, with the support of 
Premier Yoshida, argued that Sasaki was pointing to a . mere 
legal change which would not affect the moral position of the 
3 dynasty--the true index of national polity. 
Kanamori's interpretation is understandable to the Jap-
anese people. The Emperor has in fact been a mor.al, not a 
political, ruler. Consequently, sovereignty to the Japanese 
is a moral, not a political or legal, concept. This fact will 
strengthen the opponents of democracy, who will argue that 
principles have not changed, but that machinery of a more 
scientific type has been installed. It is unfortunate that 
this process of undermining the democratic movei!l3nt could 
3. House of Peers, 90th Session, August29, 1946, p. 17; 
August 30, pp. 15-16. 
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begin during the gestation period of a true constitutionalism. 
Professor Sasaki's view--that sovereignty is a legal, not a 
moral, concept and that the Emperor has been both sovereign 
and moral leader, but has surrendered sovereignty while re-
taining moral leadership--exhibits an understan~lng of the 
issue. Although this is the only story here mentioned, it is 
conceivable that the Japanese bureaucratic officials share 
more Kanamori and Yoshida's attitude than Professor Sasaki's 
and would not welcome wholeheartedly those new laws and decree 
of democratic reform. Unless Japan 1 s statesmen are willing 
and vigorous exponents of democratic reforms, there can only 
result a period of confused thinking which would undoubtedly 
diminish the effectiveness and thus be unable to meet the aim 
of the laws and decrees as drafted. 
C. THE TECHNIS4UE UNSOUND. 
As already dis cussed in the second Chapter, the tech-
nique for the carrying out of democratic reforms is to rely 
upon the Japanese Emperor and the existing government machine 
to execute and check all measures proposed by SCAP. This re- · 
liance, however, threatens the long-term objective of democ~ 
ratization, and might be accountable for some of the present 
unhappy signs of undemocratic activities which are to be dis-
cussed in the next section. 
It goes without saying that what makes complete the 
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cooperation of the averag e Japanese with the occupation pol-
icies, which causes its i:nmediate success, is the will of the 
Emperor. 1~e Emperor made known to the people, .prior to the 
entries of the Allied forces, that it was his will that the 
people cooperate with all directives of the occupation troops. 
And his people have complied accordingly. 
Thus we see quite clearly that the democratic reform 
in Japan is founded on the will of one man, one formerly divine 
man, not the free and voluntary will of the Japanese people. 
This makes it difficult to see whether there is any democracy 
in a real sense. One may easily point out that it is still 
dictatorial in nature because the democratic reform is dictated 
by one man, the same man who dictated Japanese militarism and 
aggression before. And it is extremely dangerous because it 
is easier for one man to change his will than for free men to 
change their wills. 
To rely upon the local governments to execute democratic 
reform is equally questionable. The local governments today, 
unlike before, do not necessarily follow the order of the im-
perial government. The Whole process is: SCAP issues direc-
tives to the Imperial Japanese Government in Tokyo, but since 
the latter is not primarily an operating agency, it is most 
cases translates the directives into government decrees and 
issues them to prefectural and local administrators for com-
pliance. Under the new constitution with the decentralization 
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of government powers, the local authorities have become in-
creasingly independent. The forty-seven governors are elected 
If they fail to comply with the orders, no one shall reprimand 
them. The only thing they need to do is to fool the occupation 
forces stationed within their areas by bowing low and showing 
obedience to the~, and everything will be all right. 
Nor can you depend upon the Japanese police to check and 
execute democratic reforms. Japan is traditionally a police 
state. The people's attitude toward police is inherently 
fear. Most of the Japanese police are pre-war men and not re-
educated. ~heir tactics of intimidation and pressure on the 
people could hardly change. 
D. PROGRESS NOT SATISFACTORY 
The reform laws and decrees, good as they were, did not 
achieve final success or meet the long-term objectives as 
desired. Typical evidences are shown in SCAP's dissolution 
of a number of ultra-nationalistic societies as discussed in 
Chapter VI and the re-education in Chapter XV. 
It is true that old patriotic and ultra-nationalistic 
societies were disbanded by SCAP directive three years ago, 
but new ones sprout instead. Under the freedom of associa-
tion as prescribed in the new constitution, and since they do 
not openly oppose the occupation policy, these new patriotic 
societies have developed naturally and rapidly. Their 
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organizations and activities were repeatedly reported by Mr. 
Gordon Walker of the Christian Scie nce Monitor and Mr. 
Lindesay Parrott of the New York Times. 4 Tokyo police auth-
ority stated that by June, 1948 , there were more than 1,260 
such organizations throughout Japan. The biggest ones, accord 
ing to both correspondents, are the Kikuhata Doshi Kai (Chry-
santhemum Comrades Society), Kibo Kai (Hope Society), Shochoku 
Seishin Shiru{O Kai (Imperial Rescript Spirit Promotion Society 
Wakabato Kai (Young Pigeons' Society, consisting of former Air 
Corps cadets), and Akagi Mountain Society. Their common pur-
pose is the glorification and aggrandizement of the Japanese 
as well as loyalty to the Emperor. 5 It is in fact, not differ 
ent from that of the former dissolved societies. For example, 
when the Chrysanthemum Comrades Society was first formed . in 
6 
June, 1947, the following declaration was issued: 
The Sovereign and his subjects must be in-
separably united as one body and loyalty and filial 
piety must be one and the same thing for generations 
in Japan. The Sovereign looks after his subjects 
and takes over the works left by his ancestors, while 
the subjects render devoted services to the Sovereign 
and follow the will of their fathers •••• We young men 
should rise, diagnose the trend of the times, carry 
4. For details of these new nationalistic societies, see 
Christian Science Monitor, Nov. 1 and 3, Dec. 4, 1947; Apr. 
28, June 22, 24, 1948. A.ls o see The New York Times, Feb. 
20, 1949. . 
5. The Christ ian Science Monitor, June 22, 1948 . 
6. Ibid., June 22, 1948. 
out a revolution under the Imperial standard. 
Particularly significant are the societies formed by the 
ex-servicemen, such as the Akagi Mountain Society, consisting 
of former members of trench mortar units, Young Pigeons' 
Society of former airmen, Rasutonia Society of former Japanese 
Imperial Navy men. They dreamed of the Japanese past and are 
dissatisfied with the present. Also, Mr. 1Jilalker told us that 
at the end of 1947, there were 120,000 former service-men 
operating collective farms on former parade grounds, military 
schools and airfields. Known as the Development Corps, they 
are maintaining military organization and precedure, and re-
ceiving government subsidy for purchase of farm implements and 
livestock. These veterans even hold daily mass drills under 
the forzmr serviceman whom they still address as "Commanding 
Off leer". 7 
The members of these rightist societies even copied the 
terroristic tactics in intimidating Japanese young democracy 
as their predecessors had done in the thirties. The killer 
of Katsumi Kikunami, President of the Japanese Congress of 
Industrial Organizations and the bombing of Kiyuchi Tokuda, 
Communist General Secretary during the . latter 1 s speaking 
tour in Kyushu, were reported members of those rightist 
8 
societies. 
7. Ibid., June 24, 1948. 
8. The New York Times, · Feb. 20, 1949. 
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In the field of re-educa t ion the slowness of the progress 
is shown by the fact that both the Japanese teachers and the 
policemen have not been re-educated. Most of the scho ol text-
books have been rewritten, but not satisfactorily. The histo 
books .tail to show Japanese guilt for the Twenty-one Demands 
made on China in 1915, and Japanese a gg ression on Manchuria 
and China since 1931. 9 The money for national education is 
pitiably smll, only 3.4% in the 1947-48 budget. The Japanese 
monuments exalting the war spirit are still standing in Tokyo 
and elsewhere. The 65,000-word arrogant affidavit of General 
Tojo, number-one war criminal tried in the December of 1947, 
won big headlines and full page printing on the Japanese news-
papers and were applauded by the Japanese people. 
Various reasons account for the unsatisfactory progress 
of the democratic reform. Aside from the loopholes existing 
.in the laws and decrees themselves, the twisting interpreta-
tion of laws, and the technical weakness, as discussed above, 
the unstable international situation and the economic dis-
location following the disastrous military defeat are strong 
factors. 
2. Conclusion. Japan's to tali tar ian political system 
has its history of more than two thousand years. She has not 
experienced the Renaissance and Reformation as we had in the 
Western countries, nor bad she such great political thinkers 
9. Ge~.Shang Cheng's complaint in the Allied Council for Japan on 
Nov. 26, 1948~ 
I 
I 
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as Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Rousseau or 
Adam Smith. Ours was a system, of course, entirely new to 
them. 
The authoritarian tradition of Japan was built on a 
theory--State Shintoism (with the help of Confucianism and 
Buddhism); furnished with a cons titution--Meiji Constitution; 
and supplemented with the Zaibatsu-Militarist alliance, Kem-
pel tai, and centralized police and educational system. The 
measures of democratic reform discussed in this thesis are , 
supposed to smash the age-old, complicated and feudalistic 
political machine, and are intended to build up in its place 
a new system on the model of Western democracies. Although 
not complete or adequate enough to guarantee the durability 
of the future democracy of Ja];)an, those measures have hit the 
major points, and the main road General MacArthur walked on 
is right. 
The work of democratic reform of Japan is certainly un-
finished. And three years are too short a time for so stu-
pendous and so complicated a work. However, General Mac-
Arthur's achievements, particularly in the first one year and 
a half of the occupation, should be acknowledged as satis-
factory. 
The weak point in the reform is that the Japanese people 
lack initiative themselves. They lack leadership. Almost I 
everything is sponsored by SCAP and accepted by them, willingly! 
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or unwillingly. They have recommended no law for this effort 
even in their new and all powerful diet under the 1947 con-
stitution. This is dangerous because evidently the occupation ! 
authorities cannot rule them forever, the Japanese must even-
tually rule themselves. Certainly we cannot allow Japan to 
return to her past which has threatened world peace. 
One of the most forceful criticisms of the occupation 
and its democratic policy is made by Professor E. Reischauer 
1 
of Harvard. Mr. Reischauer has said publicly that SCAP has 
been doing everything (i.e. governing) for the Japanese and 
hence the Japanese have had little opportunity in four years 
to learn the art of self-government which is democracy. This 
criticism certainly gives the reason why the Japanese have 
lacked initiative, as criticized by the writer. It seems that 
1 
the American government is shifting its policy in favor of Mr . J 
Reischauer's view, although the latter 1 s opinion was perhaps 
not heard by Washington authorities. General MacArthur stated 
on May 2, 1949, the second anniversary of Japan's democratic 
ttno war" Constitution, that he is going to ease the occupation 
controls, and said Japan's continued occupation was caused by 
2 international "events and circumstancestt. Furthermore, the 
1. Conference of League of Women Voters, Spring 1949, held 
at Radcliff College. See Christian Science Monitor 
January 27, 1949. 
2. The New York Times, May 3, 1949. 
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State Department told the Far Eastern Commission on W~y 6, 
1949, th.a t tbe United States favors giving Japan increasing 
direction of her own affairs in the international field as 
well as in the domes tic field in order to facilitate the 
development of responsible government. 3 And on May 12, the 
United States announced stopping Japanese reparation. 4 
Apparently both Mr. Reischauer's view and the new policie 
of Washington ·authorities will not win the favor from the Far 
Eastern allies, who have been victims of former Japanese ag-
gression. Although t he Chinese did not comment, Brig. Gen. 
Carlos P. Romulo of the Philippine Republic certainly felt 
5 
"flabbergasted". Perhaps this shift of policy might not be 
agreed by Professor Nathaniel Peffer. In an article pub-
lished by the Ne~ York Times Magazine on May 1, 1949, Pro-
feasor Peffer said: 
Now it is known to all that our object bas 
gradually but recognizably changed, that the occupa-
tion has softened. Stage by stage we have reduced 
reparations; we have looked the other way when, 
little by little, the same men who were in power 
before the war have one by one eased themselves 
into power again ••• If an:lwhen the occupation with-
draws, the basic social structure of Japan wi 11 be 
what it was before. 
As a Chinese who has been familiar with the habit of the 
Japanese people, the writer fully agrees with Profess or Peffer. 
3. Ibid., May 7, 1949. 
4. Ibid., May 13, 1949. 
5. Ibid., May 13,1949. 
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'I'he writer bases his judgement on the fact that the political 
machine of Japan today is still predominantly controlled by 
the conservatives and the old-line bureaucracy. However~ he 
favors somewhat relaxing the control while continuing a long 
and vigilant supervision. 
The future of Japanese democracy chiefly depends, among 
other things, upon ths international situation as well as her 
internal economic situation. We must not allow Japanese 
democracy to be sacrificed in the cold war or in a possible 
shooting war between two giants of the world--the United Stat 
and the Soviet Russia. How can that be? 
Evidently as a a oldie r, General MacArthur would never 
ne glect Japan's strategic position and her efficient man-power 
in the event of war. Already we have heard in this country 
the voice of rearming the former enemies (the Japanese and the 
Germans too). This voice might be higher and higher following 
the deterioration of the world situation. However, it is 
highly possible that in Japan, once the rearmament begins, 
her d emoc racy ends • 
Her internal economic situation is equally important. 
How to feed these 70,000,000 Japanese is a big question. 
American tax-payelffl can not feed them forever. They must con-
trive to feed themselves~ within those four islands, no matter 
how small the lands are. Hunger and poverty means disorder 
and social unrest which is certainly fertile for dictatorship 
of any kind, and not ror democracy. The only reply to this 
question is her industrial rehabilitation which means stable 
raw materials and a world mar ke t. No longer can she take 
these thin~ by force as she did before. She must depend, 
again, upon world peace and international free intercourse. 
The thesis ends, therefore, in the following two 
sentences: 
(1) The Democratic reform in Japan is for world peace. 
(2) World peace closely determines the fate of Japanese 
democracy . 
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